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South China Sea Area Sea Crimes: Abu Sayyaf Militants May Have Grabbed 3 Indonesians at Sea and Why Such Attacks Occur

Reported by the Jakarta Globe, "Three Indonesian Crewmembers Reportedly Kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf Militants":

Area in Interest (click on image to enlarge)

Three crewmembers of an Indonesian vessel have reportedly been kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf militants in the southern Philippines, a Foreign Ministry official said on Monday (23/01).

The Indonesians were reported missing after Malaysian authorities found their boat unoccupied in waters off Taganak in Sabah last Thursday at 1.09 p.m.

"As of this time, the Malaysian authorities have conducted an investigation but have not reached a conclusion. However, our sources in the Philippines have confirmed that the three Indonesians were moved to Sulu Island in the southern Philippines," said Lalu Muhammad Iqbal, the director of citizen protection and legal aid at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as reported by state news agency Antara.

One of the victims has informed his family in Indonesia that he has been taken hostage, Lalu added.

The crews of three other boats reportedly witnessed the attack, but they have not been questioned.
***
There have been 16 attacks since last March last year on ships passing through the Sulu and Celebes seas, through which about $40 billion worth of cargo passes each year, according to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).

The government-backed anti-piracy organization says over a dozen crewmembers are currently being held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf militants, all of them kidnapped from ships sailing through the Sulu and Celebes seas.

The Taganak Islands are also known as the Turtle Islands.

A WaPo article suggests the motivations for such kidnappings both off the Philippines and other locales:

Despite the Philippine government’s efforts to crush Abu Sayyaf, the Jakarta Post reported the group took in more than $7 million in ransom money to free 20 hostages seized during the first half of 2016.

The militant group used these funds to purchase weapons, ammunition and other supplies to counter a renewed Philippine military offensive — and implement an extensive series of bombings, including one detonated in the home town of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte.

The Philippine and Indonesian governments announced plans in June to coordinate naval patrols in the Southern Sulu archipelago to curb the maritime threat and cut off Abu Sayyaf‘s coffers.

This rationale for the kidnappers makes sense and adds to their vicious reputation at the same time.

South of the South China Sea Fun: Indonesia and U.S. to Work Together Off Indonesian Waters

ABS-CBN News reports "Indonesia, US plan joint patrols on edge of Indonesian waters":

Indonesia and the United States have planned to carry out joint patrols around the outer maritime boundaries of Indonesian territorial waters in an effort to combat illegal fishing and human trafficking, Indonesia's Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries said Wednesday.

Indonesia has been cracking down on illegal fishing recently as set out by Nick Wadhams and Bill Faries of Bloomberg in"Blowing Up Boats Sets Indonesia’s Scarce Fish Swimming Again":

Since the end of that year, Indonesia has destroyed 220 foreign boats. It has also faced increased Chinese claims that waters surrounding the gas-rich Natuna Islands are part of traditional Chinese fishing grounds.
“We catch them and we sink them,” Pudjiastuti said of the boats. “That’s the new rule, the national consensus.”
“If you fish in my EEZ, that’s illegal fishing,” she said, referring to Indonesia’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. “If that fish is in my EEZ, that’s mine. If that fish swims past the EEZ, that’s anybody’s.”

See my previous posts on Indonesia and its push back against China's aggressive claim to SCS ownership China's Fishing Fleet: Apparently Only Chinese Waters Are Sovereign and Malaysia Complains About Chinese Fishing Fleet "Intruding" Into Its Waters, Indonesia Continues Protest of Chinese Incursions.

Why the fuss? Nice discussion of part of the issues in the SCS region at Fishing, not oil, is at the heart of the South China Sea dispute:

For a relatively small (around 3 million square kilometres) patch of the oceans, the South China Sea delivers an astonishing abundance of fish. The area is home to at least 3,365 known species of marine fishes, and in 2012, an estimated 12% of the world’s total fishing catch, worth US$21.8 billion, came from this region.

These living resources are worth more than money; they are fundamental to the food security of coastal populations numbering in the hundreds of millions.

Indeed, a recent study showed that the countries fringing the South China Sea are among the most reliant in the world on fish as source of nutrients. This makes their populations especially susceptible to malnutrition as fish catches decline.

These fisheries also employ at least 3.7 million people (almost certainly an underestimate given the level of unreported and illegal fishing in the region).
***
The South China Sea’s fisheries are seriously over-exploited.

Last year, two of us contributed to a report finding that 55% of global marine fishing vessels operate in the South China Sea. We also found that fish stocks have declined 70% to 95% since the 1950s.

Over the past 30 years, the number of fish caught each hour has declined by a third, meaning fishers are putting in more effort for less fish.

This has been accelerated by destructive fishing practices such as the use of dynamite and cyanide on reefs, coupled with artificial island-building. The coral reefs of the South China Sea have been declining at a rate of 16% per decade.

Even so, the total amount of fish caught has increased. But the proportion of large species has declined while the proportion of smaller species and juvenile fish has increased. This has disastrous implications for the future of fishing in the South China Sea.

Over-fished and vital to the local populations surrounding the SCS.

Perfect source for conflict.

Indonesia has also entered into a joint patrol agreement with the Philippines:

The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Wiranto said Indonesia and the Philippines have reached an agreement to conduct joint patrol on the Sulu waters in the Philippines.

“Joint maritime patrols will be carried out to monitor Sulu waters, which is prone to piracy,” Wiranto said yesterday, September 14, 2016, at Senayan Parliamentary Complex Jakarta.

According to Wiranto, the respective countries’ armed forces will be allowed to handle pirates in the Sulu waters. The agreement will enable Indonesian personnel to pursue and subdue pirates even if they crossed the Philippine borders. Previously, Indonesia had encountered difficulty for its inablility to cross the Philippine waters in hot pursuit of pirates. “It’s a key issue,” he said.

For those who may have forgotten, Indonesia is the world's fifth most populous country (if you count the EU as a single entity) with 255+ million people. 6000 inhabited islands (out of 17,000) and a bumper crop of volcanoes.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 17 May - 15 June 2016 and a New Maritime Security Approach in Southeast Asia

Office of Naval Intelligence Threats to Shipping:

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 17 May - 15 June 2016

Not mentioned in the report (due to its timing), Three southeast Asian nations to designate shipping corridor to battle piracy:

Celebes and Sulu Seas indicated by ovals

The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia signed the agreement to designate a transit corridor for commercial vessels in order to prevent hijacks by pirates.

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines on Monday agreed to designate a transit corridor for commercial vessels crossing a maritime zone hit by a spate of hijackings by Islamist militants in the southern Philippines.

Nearly 20 Indonesian and Malaysian tugboat crew have been kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf militants this year, with Jakarta airing fears that the problem could reach levels seen off the coast of Somalia.
****
Analysts say $40-billion worth of cargo passes through the Sulu and Celebes seas each year, including supertankers from the Indian Ocean that cannot use the crowded Malacca Strait.

The three countries also agreed to step up air and sea patrols and escorts for commercial ships in the common maritime areas to fend off potential hijacks, kidnaps and robbery.

Philippine Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin said the leaders agreed to share the best practices evolved by Indonesia and Malaysia during a joint effort to patrol the busy Malacca Strait waterway against pirates, as a model for three-way cooperation with the Philippines.

****

Analysts say $40-billion worth of cargo passes through the Sulu and Celebes seas each year, including supertankers from the Indian Ocean that cannot use the crowded Malacca Strait.

The three countries also agreed to step up air and sea patrols and escorts for commercial ships in the common maritime areas to fend off potential hijacks, kidnaps and robbery.

Philippine Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin said the leaders agreed to share the best practices evolved by Indonesia and Malaysia during a joint effort to patrol the busy Malacca Strait waterway against pirates, as a model for three-way cooperation with the Philippines.

***

There was no immediate comment from the Abu Sayyaf rebels.

Piracy near Somalia’s coast has subsided after shipping firms hired private security details and international warships patrolled the waters.

It's a Reuters report. Love the "no immediate comment from the . . . rebels" bit.

Screw FONOPS - Let's Play Hardball in the South China Sea

The South China Sea is not now, nor should it ever become, a Chinese "lake."

Allowing China to have its way in the region is not good for international commerce, surrounding nations and the bodes ill for further Chinese expansionism as it asserts some fabricated "historical usage" right to waters that it sailed in "once upon a time." That "once upon a time" ended hundreds of years ago when China, due to internal reasons, abandoned the high seas and ended its exploration of the world.

Now, however, having read Mahan and studied its position in the world, China has decided that its "manifest destiny" lies in invading both international waters and the domestic waters of its neighbors to force them into a world where their adjacent seas are dominated by Chinese warships (including its large, aggressive "Coast Guard") as well as by a militia force of fishing vessels. Why? To create a 'strategic strait'?

"The logical conclusion drawn from China's adding ... islands in the southern part of the South China Sea with military-sized runways, substantial port facilities, radar platforms and space to accommodate military forces is that China's objective is to dominate the waters of the South China Sea at will," Peter Dutton, professor and director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, said in a February speech at London's Chatham House.

"Building the islands is therefore, in my view, a significant strategic event," he said. "They leave the potential for the South China Sea to become a Chinese strait, rather than an open component of the global maritime commons."

Tuoi Tre News

The proof of this Chinese approach is daily recounted in news reports of the shouldering or ramming non-Chinese fishing vessels, in the aggressive response of Chinese military forces to military aircraft and ships transiting in what the rest of the world recognizes as "international waters" but which the Chinese are intent on grabbing. See Dangerous rocks in the South China Sea from the Washington Post:

Having made a “rebalancing” toward Asia a pillar of his foreign policy, President Obama may face a fateful test from China in his final months in office. President Xi Jinping already broke a promise he made to Mr. Obama not to militarize islets his regime has been building up in two parts of the South China Sea. Now Beijing appears to be contemplating building a base on a contested shoal just 150 miles from Subic Bay in the Philippines. A failure by the administration to prevent this audacious step could unravel much of what it has done to bolster U.S. influence in the region.

Disputed islands per Inhabit.com (red flags with yellow star = Vietnam; red/blue striped flag = Malaysia; other red/white/blue flag = Philippines; red flag with star in upper left = China)

Chinese development of Scarborough Shoal, a collection of rocks and coral reefs it seized from the Philippines four years ago, would escalate its already-belligerent behavior in the South China Sea in a number of ways. Until now, Beijing’s landfill work and construction of airstrips have occurred on islets it already controlled that are considerably closer to the Chinese mainland. Scarborough Shoal lies about 500 miles from China. A base there could allow Chinese radar and missiles to threaten Manila, as well as Philippine bases where U.S. forces are positioned.

Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese venture would concretize Beijing’s refusal to abide by international law in resolving territorial disputes with its neighbors.

The nations surrounding the South China Sea (SCS) are either arming themselves or inviting allies to "come back" and show a level of possible force.

One response of the United States has been to sail naval vessels into the SCS and conduct "Freedom of Navigation Operations" or "FONOPS."

These SCS FONOPS are discussed in a National Interest article by Zack Cooper and Bonnie S. Glaser, How America Picks Its Next Move in the South China Sea which describes the U.S.'s tiptoeing in and around the Chinese island building and aggression in the SCS. This is certainly a nice, nuanced approach to the situation, sending signals that are meant to warn the Chinese but without raising the stakes too high.

It also isn't working.

Fiery Cross Reef

The Chinese have moved from area to area, building military bases on artificial island after artificial island, with the latest efforts in the Spratly Islands.

As noted in several of the links above, China and the Philippines are awaiting a ruling from from an arbitration panel over the Chinese claims to the SCS - a ruling China has already denounced, despite many good reasons why it shouldn't.

As was discussed during one of the Midrats podcasts, Episode 321: The Year of the Monkey in the South China Sea w/Toshi Yoshihara (starting about 16:21), China views international law as not being binding because, it does not reflect Chinese "traditions." but rather "Western legal traditions" because of differing historical perspectives - China wants to start with "history first" as Dr. Yoshihara expressed it.

History may not be "bunk" but certain "historical events" are completely ignored by the Chinese as the make their claims, including World Wars I and II, and the last 70+ years of free access to the seas granted to the Chinese around the world brought to them courtesy of the Western world, especially by the U.S. and its allies.

When China was building up its large merchant shipping force, who was protecting freedom of the seas?

Hint - it wasn't the Chinese navy.

If any country could have made the SCS into a "lake" it would have been the U.S. following WWII - but which, instead, backed out of the area.

 China, not content with a free sea, is trying to fill what it perceives as a void and is not getting much in the way of push-back.

It's time the international community did something stronger than FONOPS, which are weak tea at best.

Sea Launch  Odyssey company photo

My modest proposal is to send a properly modified self-propelled drilling rig into the area and have it anchor itself at or near one of those SCS rock formations that China claims but which are generally not uncovered by the sea. Man the thing with scientists who ought to be screaming their heads off about the changing of the ecological state of the SCS by the Chinese island building campaign. Fly the UN flag. Support it from the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and

Ocean Odyssey before modifications

any other SCS stakeholders.

In short, it is time to quit playing soft games with the Chinese and move to hardball. Time to challenge every encroachment. Time to move to a higher level of activity. Time to increase the signal strength, if signaling is still needed.

Use this "sea base" as the locus of naval exercises involving those stakeholders and Aussies, Japanese, South Koreans and anyone else who chooses to play - except the Chinese.

Oh. and by the way, we need to take a look at Guam's status, too. 51st state. anyone?

Time to re-look at building up Midway? Wake Island?

Hardball.

China's Fishing Fleet: Apparently Only Chinese Waters Are Sovereign

Natuna Islands circled outlined in yellow

It ought to be clear to most people paying attention that China uses its fishing fleet as tool in its aggressive, expansionist efforts in the South China sea as well as a force of to intrude on the sovereign rights of other nations outside the South China Sea. One of the latest incidents involves China's powerful "Coast Guard" using force to retrieve a fishing boat captured by Indonesian forces inside Indonesian waters, as reported by the Jakarta Globe here:

Minister of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs Susi Pudjiastuti will summon the Chinese ambassador to Indonesia on Monday (21/03) over reports of a standoff between Chinese coast guards and Indonesian officials trying to capture a ship illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, although China says the incident happened in "a traditional Chinese fishing ground."

Susi said Indonesian officials were pursuing the ship Kway Fey 10078 at 2.15 p.m. on Saturday, for illegally fishing off the coast of Indonesia's Natuna islands as it attempted to flee to the contested South China Sea.

Three officials managed to climb on board and arrested a total of eight crew members, but a Chinese coast guard ship intervened and rammed the fishing ship back into the South China Sea.

“We will summon the Chinese ambassador [ Xie Feng] to discuss the issue [on Monday]. Because in the process of capturing the ship, a standoff occurred,” she told reporters on Sunday. “We respect China, but we must also maintain our sovereignty.”

The incident, she said, occurred just 4.34 kilometers off Indonesia's Natuna islands, which meant it was well inside Indonesia's exclusive economic zone.

“We want to avoid a much more serious incident, so we settled on just arresting the eight crew members. The ship got away but we have the eight men in custody to help us investigate this incident,” Susi said.

The Chinese embassy said in a statement issued late on Sunday night that the area where the incident occurred is "a traditional Chinese fishing ground."

"The Chinese fishing vessel was conducting its regular operation when chased by an armed Indonesian vessel," embassy spokesman Xu Hangtian said in the statement, adding: "It is hoped that the Indonesian side could properly handle this issue, taking into consideration the overall picture of our bilateral relations."

Natuna Islands? Was it just last November when China conceded sovereignty over Natuna to Indonesia? See here:

On Nov. 12, China shocked the countries in the region by issuing a first-ever public statement on the Natuna Islands. According to Hong Lei, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, “The Indonesian side has no territorial claim to China’s [Spratly Islands]. The Chinese side has no objection to Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands.”

This is significant because, although the Natuna Islands are outside of China’s self-designated “Nine-Dash-Line” that lays claim to virtually all of the South China Sea, Natuna’s 200-miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ) protrudes into the area defined by the Nine-Dash-Line. To publicly recognize Indonesia’s sovereign right to the Natunas means China’s acknowledgment of Indonesia’s legitimate claim to an EEZ inside China’s self-claimed Nine-Dash-Line.

And this is not something that China has been willing to do, partly because of the inexact nature of the so-called Nine-Dash-Line and partly because China does not want to show weakness to its smaller neighbors who challenge its maritime claims. Beijing’s failure to clarify with Indonesia the competing claims on the Natuna Islands and the EEZ lies at the root of the angst felt by Jakarta for decades.

Of course, there is the hilariously geographically challenged headline from Fortune regarding China's contretemps: China Goes 1 for 2 in Fishing Boat Wars With Neighbors

China’s fishing fleet got itself involved in a second diplomatic incident for the second time in a week–and this time, it used force to secure a better outcome.

Only days after Argentina sank a Chinese fishing boat that it alleged was fishing illegally in its waters, a Chinese coastguard ship intervened to stop Indonesia impounding another trawler that Jakarta said was fishing illegally in the Natuna Sea, an area between Peninsular Malaysia and the Malaysian province of Sarawak on Borneo island

First, Argentina and China are not even in the same hemisphere or even on the same side of the equator and, thus, are hardly neighbors. A look at a map of the South China Sea region will reveal that China and Indonesia are pretty widely separated. The only "neighborly" aspect to their relationship is China's assertion of "special" if not sovereign rights over a large chunk of the South China Sea - which is downright un-neighborly if you ask me. More about that Argentine thing here.

More about China's aggressive moves in the SCS in a nice post at CIMSEC by Natalie Sambhi CHINA TO INDONESIA: THANKS FOR ALL THE FISH:

The incident complicates Indonesia’s long-held nonaligned stance in which it has carefully maintained the semblance of good relations with both China and the United States. On closer inspection, there is a qualitative difference between Indonesia’s security relationships with China and the United States. Cooperation with the United States is far more established and covers a greater number and variety of activities than activities with China. This latest incident could result in a turn toward even greater depth in that longstanding relationship, particularly in the maritime domain. But more importantly, this is an opportunity for Indonesia to now actively lobby other Indo-Pacific states — in particular Japan, India and Australia — to work together in the maritime sphere.

China’s behavior undercuts the Indonesian president’s Global Maritime Fulcrum vision. This concept positions sovereignty front and center, and has the eradication of illegal fishing as a core domestic element. Despite wanting to keep good relations with China and investment flowing into the country, Indonesia can’t afford to sweep this incident under the rug. China’s “liberation” of its vessel from Indonesian law enforcement, in Indonesian waters, shows flagrant disregard for Indonesia’s sovereignty.

Malacca Straits and South China Sea Piracy: Combined Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore patrols?

Reported as by IHS Maritime 360 Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore discuss joint patrols:

The navies of littoral states Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are in talks to extend joint patrols to the lower reaches of South China Sea in a bid to curb piracy.

Rear Admiral Lai Chung Han, chief of the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), highlighted some of the challenges in conducting these joint patrols such as competing territorial claims in these waters.

"There is concern with the proximity to the contested claims of South China Sea, and we certainly don't want those issues to be conflated. We are very focused on dealing with the piracy situation and none of us really benefit from letting this situation fester," said Rear Adm Lai.

He also does not rule out the possibility of collaboration between certain militant groups and pirates in attacking Western economic interests at strategic sea lanes such as the Strait of Malacca.

"Of course when there is any doubt, we never rule out the possibility that the pirates on board, or the ship that has been commandeered, could also be used for terrorist purposes, and we have the means to deal with that," added Rear Adm Lai.

There is already in place an agreement covering the Strait of Malacca. This new agreement would allow expansion of the area covered apparently into areas impacted by small tanker hijackings.

As you can see from the nearby image from the ICC's International Maritime Bureau's Live Piracy Map pirate attacks in the area are common.

Strait of Malacca Piracy: "Nooks and Crannies" make it "the most dangerous waters"

A look at the increases in sea robberies off the main path of the Malacca Strait, suggesting "alternative," theoretically safer, routes at Piracy in the Malacca Straits: Pirates likely to bring a quick end to historic trade route":

The number of attacks in the straits as a whole had dropped but it is the rising figures in Indonesia that has made the straits more dangerous than the waters off Somalia. Of the 138 piracy incidents recorded worldwide in the first six months of this year, 48 were in Indonesia. While global piracy had dropped substantially, down from 439 cases in 2011, the figures in Indonesia, however, was increasing. Most attacks happen in the waters around the Riau province, particularly around the ports in Dumai and Belawan.

New areas are emerging. One of them is around the island of Batam and nearby Belakang Island, which is close to Singapore. Batam is a low-cost manufacturing enclave and the products are exported via Singapore. Poor Indonesians who head for Batam for jobs and local fishermen battling with poor fishing yields are the prime targets of pirate mafias. The local mafias organise criminal activities alongside bigger syndicates.

These are low-level thefts in enclaves and areas that are hidden from the main route. They are not high-sea robberies that can be easily detected and crippled. Years ago, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore launched a campaign that aimed at curtailing piracy in the 960km long Malacca Straits. It has been successful in that the number of high-sea robberies has dropped and that the international shipping lane is much safer. But not the nooks and crannies.

Sorry, sounds like a solution in search of a problem. If Indonesia cleans up it own waters, this "problem" mostly goes away.

"Pirate mafias" attacking local workers and fishermen is not a reason to re-route large commercial shipping.

South China Sea Counter-Piracy: Philippines may join with Malaysia and Indonesia for patrols

Reported as "Philippines eyeing joint sea patrol with neighbors" :

The Philippine defense chief says his country and neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia are considering joint patrols of their sea borders to combat piracy, smuggling and movement of al-Qaida-linked militants.

Sounds like a good idea, akin to that of the ReCAAP program, which had its origins in fighting piracy/sea robbery in the Strait of Malacca.

Hijacked Tug Rescued Off Indonesia

Reported as Indonesia Rescues Hijacked Tug Boat :

Indonesian authorities have rescued a tug boat with nine crew believed to have been hijacked in the Straits of Singapore, a sea lane seeing a rise in attacks, an official said on Monday.

The boat was recovered on Saturday off Indonesia, said Noel Choong, head of the piracy reporting center of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).

It had been towing a barge laden with heavy machinery and piling materials which an Indonesian aircraft and three warships found in the same area a day later, he added.

The tug and barge, heading from peninsular Malaysia to Borneo island, last made contact on December 27 off southern Malaysia near the Straits of Singapore before it was hijacked, Choong said.

Circle on map indicates area involved.

Strait of Malacca Maritime Security: DoD-funded Integrated Maritime Surveillance System

An announcement from the U.S. Department of State DoD-funded Integrated Maritime Surveillance System:

Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
November 18, 2011

From FY2006 to FY2008 the U.S. Government provided approximately $57 million via the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1206 to support Indonesia’s establishment of an Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS) strategically located to cover Malacca Strait, Sulawesi Sea, and Moluccas Strait.

The fully operational IMSS enhances Indonesia’s ability to detect, track, and monitor vessels passing through territorial and international waters. This capability is crucial to combating piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, and terrorism within and around Indonesia’s maritime borders. The IMSS helps achieve Indonesian and U.S. maritime security goals and exemplifies bilateral cooperation under the Comprehensive Partnership, along with setting conditions for increased multilateral collaboration with Malaysia and the Philippines.

The IMSS is a tightly integrated network of ship and shore based sensors, communications devices, and computing resources that collect, transmit, analyze and display a broad array of maritime data including automatic identification system (AIS), surface radar, surveillance cameras, global positioning system (GPS), equipment health monitors and radio transmissions of maritime traffic in wide operating areas. Redundant sensors and multiple communication paths make the IMSS a robust and capable system.

The IMSS was officially handed over to the Government of Indonesia following an Operational Demonstration conducted in Surabaya on October 25, 2011. The IMSS is manned and operated by the Indonesian Navy, and consists of 18 Coastal Surveillance Stations (CSS), 11 Ship-based Radars, two Regional Command Centers, and two Fleet Command Centers (Jakarta and Surabaya)

The U.S. government remains committed to improving maritime domain awareness in the region and has allocated an additional $4.6 to ensure sustainment until 2014.

More on the IMSS from it's developer here:

Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (Techno-Sciences, Inc. photos)

Trident's Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS) is designed for governments and other appropriate authorities challenged with demanding Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Common Operating Picture (COP) requirements.

The IMSS is a tightly integrated network of ship and shore based sensors, communications devices and computing resources that collect, transmit, analyze and display a broad array of disparate data including automatic information system (AIS), radar, surveillance cameras, global positioning system (GPS), equipment health monitors and radio transmissions of maritime traffic in a wide operating area. Redundant sensors and multiple communications paths make the system robust and still functional even in the case of a major component failure.

The clever open architecture and purposeful use commercial off-the-shelf components provides the customer tremendous flexibility in making performance-cost trade offs today and in making capability upgrades and additions tomorrow.

Malacca Strait Piracy: "Arrests Reveal Major Criminal Operations"

Pirate Arrests Reveal Major Criminal Operations Across Malacca Strait:

Police in Aceh announced that the arrest of four suspected pirates had uncovered a highly organized and extensive criminal organization operating across the Malacca Strait.
***
Iskandar said the four, all from East Aceh, were believed to be part of a wider, highly organized pirate outfit operating extensively across the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.

He said the gang operated under the command of a prisoner currently being held at Tanjung Gusta Penitentiary in North Sumatra. “They would frequently receive instructions from him and then share their spoils with him,” the police chief said.

Strait of Malacca: Malaysia Captures Pirates

Reported inThe Jakarta Post:

Malaysian officers are questioning six Indonesians detained for allegedly attempting to hijack a ship in the Malacca Strait.

The commander of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency’s southern division, First Admiral Zulkifli Abu Bakar, said that sailors on a navy patrol boat allegedly saw the men climbing aboard a merchant ship off shore Johor Island, near Singapore, on Sunday morning.

“Once they realized that their acts were noticed, the pirates tried to flee. But our patrol vessel managed to catch up. We fired a warning shot before intercepting it in Malaysian waters,” he said on Tuesday as quoted by kompas.com.

Zulkifli said that the men apparently approached Johor from Batam, to the south, and planned to hijack three ships.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) issued a hijacking warning in June to all ships transiting the Malacca Strait.

Speaking of Chokepoints

Just the other day I posted Refresher: World Trade Route Chokepoints and now comes along a related piece from George Friedman at STRATFOR, his recognition about Indonesia's position on major sea lanes and chokepoints and the problems that poses for . . . China at Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance (his words in blue - I added the maps):

I am writing this from Indonesia. Actually, that is not altogether a fair statement. I am at the moment in Bali and just came from Jakarta. The two together do not come close to being Indonesia. Jakarta, the capital, is a vast city that is striking to me for its traffic. It takes an enormous amount of time to get anywhere in Jakarta. Like most cities, it was not built to accommodate cars, and the mix of cars with motor scooters results in perpetual gridlock. It is also a city of extraordinary dynamism. There is something happening on almost every street. And in the traffic jams, you have time to contemplate those streets in detail.

Bali is an island of great beauty, complete with mountains, white beaches, blue waters and throngs of tourists. Since I am one of those tourists, I will not trouble you with the usual tourist nonsense of wanting to be in a place where there are no tourists. The hypocrisy of tourists decrying commercialization is tedious. I am here for the beaches, and they are expensive. The locals with whom tourists claim to want to mingle can’t come into the resort, and tourists leaving the resort will have trouble finding locals who are not making a living off the tourists. As always, the chance of meeting “locals” as tourists usually define them — people making little money in picturesque ways — is not easy.

What is clear in both Jakarta and Bali is that the locals are tired of picturesque poverty, however much that disappoints the tourists. They want to live better and, in particular, they want their children to live better. We were driven by a tour guide to places where we bought what my wife assures me is art (my own taste in art runs to things in museums and tigers made of velvet). We spent the requisite money on art at places our guide delivered us to, I assume for suitable compensation.

The guide was interesting. His father was a rice farmer who owned some land, and now he is a tour guide, which in Bali, I gather, is not a bad job by any means if you have deals with the hotel (which he undoubtedly has). But it was his children who fascinated me. He had three sons, two of whom were in universities. The movement from rice farmer to university student in three generations is not trivial. That it happened with the leaders Indonesia had during that time is particularly striking, since by all reasonable measures these leaders have been, until recently, either rigidly ideological (Sukarno) or breathtakingly self-serving (Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati).

When I looked at some of Indonesia’s economic statistics, the underlying reason for this emerged. Since 1998, when Indonesia had its meltdown, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at roughly 5 percent per year, an amount substantial, consistent and above all sustainable, unlike the 8 and 9 percent growth rates before the collapse. Indonesia is now the 18th largest economy in the world, ranking just behind Turkey.

All of that is nice, but for this: Indonesia ranks 109th in per capita GDP. Indonesia’s population is about 237 million. Its fertility rate is only 2.15 births per woman, just above a stable population — though being just above stable still means substantial growth. Indonesia is a poor country, albeit not as poor as it was, and its GDP continues to rise. Given its stable government and serious efforts to control corruption, which systemically diverts wealth away from the general population, this growth can continue. But whether the stability and anti-corruption efforts of the past six years can continue is an open question, as is the prosperity in Jakarta, the tourism in Bali (recall the jihadist attacks there in 2002 and 2005) and whether our guide’s third son will receive a college education.

I saw three Indonesias (and I can assure you there are hundreds more). One was the Indonesia of Jakarta’s elite, Westernized and part of the global elite found in most capitals that is critical for managing any country’s rise to some degree of prosperity. Jakarta’s elite will do well from that prosperity, make no mistake, but they are also indispensable to it. Another Indonesia was the changing one that our upwardly mobile tour guide saw through his children’s eyes. The third was the one in which a little girl, perhaps four, begged in traffic on the road from the airport in Bali. I have seen these things in many countries and it is difficult to know what to make of them yet. For me, going to Indonesia is not the same as going to Eastern Europe. I know what is lurking under the current there. Indonesia is new for me, and I will be back. For now, let me describe to you not so much the country of Indonesia but how I try to learn about a place I know only from books (and even then relatively little).

Strategic Positions

Nietzsche once said that modern man eats knowledge without hunger. What he meant by that is that modern man learns without passion and without necessity. I didn’t go to Indonesia without either. What interests me most about Indonesia is not its economy or its people — although that might change as I learn more. What interests me now is Indonesia’s strategic position in the world at this point in time.

To determine that position, we must first look at China. China is building an aircraft carrier. Now, one aircraft carrier without cruisers, destroyers, submarines, anti-missile systems, satellite-targeting capabilities, mid-ocean refueling capabilities and a thousand other things is simply a ship waiting to be sunk. Nevertheless, it could be the nucleus of something more substantial in the coming decades (not years).

From Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (National Defense University (pdf))

When I look at a map of China’s coast I am constantly struck by how contained China is. In the north, where the Yellow and East China seas provide access to Shanghai and Qingdao (the home of China’s northern naval fleet), access to the Pacific is blocked by the line of Japan-Okinawa-Taiwan and the islands between Okinawa and Japan. Bases there are not the important point. The important point is that the Chinese naval — or merchant — fleet must pass through choke points that can be controlled by the United States, hundreds of miles to the east. The situation is even worse for China in the South China Sea, which is completely boxed in by the line of Taiwan-Philippines-Indonesia-Singapore, and worse still when you consider the emerging naval cooperation between the United States and Vietnam, which has no love for the Chinese.

The Chinese are trying to solve this problem by building ports in Pakistan and Myanmar. They say these are for commercial use, and I believe them. Isolated ports at such a distance, with tenuous infrastructure connecting them to China and with sea-lane control not assured, are not very useful. They work in peacetime but not during war, and it is war, however far-fetched, that navies are built for.

China’s biggest problem is not that it lacks aircraft carriers; it is that it lacks an amphibious capability. Even if it could, for example, fight its way across the Formosa Strait to Taiwan (a dubious proposition), it is in no position to supply the multi-divisional force needed to conquer Taiwan. The Chinese could break the blockade by seizing Japan, Okinawa or Taiwan, but that isn’t going to happen.

What could happen is China working to gain an economic toehold in the Philippines or Indonesia, and using that economic leverage to support political change in those countries. A change in the political atmosphere would not by itself permit the Chinese navy to break into the Pacific or eliminate the American ability to blockade Chinese merchant ships. The United States doesn’t need land bases to control the passages through either of these countries from a distance.

Rather, what would change the game is if China, having reached an economic entente with either country, was granted basing privileges there. That would permit the Chinese to put aircraft and missiles on the islands, engage the U.S. Navy outside the barrier formed by the archipelagos and force the U.S. Navy back, allowing free passage.

Now, this becomes much more complicated when we consider U.S. countermeasures. China already has massive anti-ship missiles on its east coast. The weakness of these missiles is intelligence and reconnaissance. In order to use those missiles the Chinese have to have a general idea of where their targets are, and ships move around a lot. That reconnaissance must come from survivable aircraft (planes that won’t be destroyed when they approach the U.S. fleet) and space-based assets — along with the sophisticated information architecture needed to combine the sensor with the shooter.

The United States tends to exaggerate the strength of its enemies. This can be a positive trait because it means extra exertion. In the Cold War, U.S. estimates of Soviet capabilities outstripped Soviet realities. There are many nightmare scenarios about China’s capabilities circulating, but we suspect that most are overstated. China’s ambitions outstrip its capabilities. Still, you prepare for the worst and hope for the best.

In this case, the primary battlefield is not yet the passages through the archipelago. It is the future of our Indonesian driver’s third child. If he gets to go to college, the likelihood of Indonesia succumbing to Chinese deals is limited. The history of Chinese-Indonesian relations is not particularly good, and little short of desperation would force an alliance. American Pacific strategy should be based on making certain that neither Indonesia nor the Philippines is desperate.

A Focus of History

Indonesia has another dimension, of course. It is the largest Muslim country in the world, and one that has harbored and defeated a significant jihadist terrorist group. As al Qaeda crumbles, the jihadist movement may endure. The United States has an ongoing interest in this war and therefore has an interest in Indonesian stability and its ability to suppress radical Islam inside its borders and, above all, prevent the emergence of an Indonesian-based al Qaeda with an intercontinental capability.

Thus, Indonesia becomes a geopolitical focus of three forces — China, Islamists and the United States. This isn’t the first time Indonesia has been a focus of history. In 1941, Japan launched the attack on Pearl Harbor to paralyze the American fleet there and facilitate seizing what was then called the Netherlands East Indies for its supplies of oil and other raw materials. In the first real resource war — World War II — Indonesia was a pivot. Similarly, during the Cold War, the possibility of a Communist Indonesia was frightening enough to the United States that it ultimately supported the removal of Sukarno as president. Indonesia has mattered in the past, and it matters now.

The issue is how to assure a stable Indonesia. If the threat — however small — rests in China, so does the solution. Chinese wage rates are surging and Chinese products are becoming less competitive in the global marketplace. The Chinese have wanted to move up the economic scale from being an exporter of low-cost industrial products to being a producer of advanced technologies. As the recent crash of China’s high-speed train shows, China is a long way from achieving that goal.

There is no question that China is losing its export edge in low-grade industrial products. One of the reasons Western investors liked China was that a single country and a single set of relationships allowed them to develop production facilities that could supply them with products. All the other options aside from India, which has its own problems, can handle only a small fraction of China’s output. Indonesia, with nearly a quarter-billion people still in a low-wage state, can handle more.

The political risk has substantially declined in the last few years. If it continues to drop, Indonesia will become an attractive alternative to China at a time when Western companies are looking for alternatives. That would energize Indonesia’s economy and further stabilize the regime. A more stable Indonesian regime would remove any attraction for an alignment with China and any opportunities for Chinese or Islamist subversion — even if, in the latter case, prosperity is not enough to eliminate it.

When we look at a map, we see the importance of Indonesia. When we look at basic economic statistics, we see the strength and weakness of Indonesia. When we consider the role of China in the world economy and its current problems, we see Indonesia’s opportunities. But it comes down to this: If my guide’s third son can go to college, and little girls no longer have to dart into traffic and beg, Indonesia has a strong future, and that future depends on it becoming the low-cost factory to the world.

Life is more complex than that, of course, but it is the beginning of understanding the possibilities. In the end, few rational people looking at China in 1975 would have anticipated China in 2011. That unexpected leap is what Indonesia needs and what will determine its geopolitical role. But these are my first thoughts on Indonesia. I will need to come back here many times for any conclusions.

Read more: Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance | STRATFOR

In my recent refresher post on chokepoints, I pointed out that they don't change position - what is a chokepoint today will be one tomorrow, and was one in the past. As a proof of this proposition, take a look at the map below, which shows how the Japanese were planning to protect the vital sea lanes and chokepoints of their empire in 1941:

From the University of Texas Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection

You might want to take a look at China: Sri Lanka and the Chinese String of Pearls
and the links therein. From that post:

Map is from JOE 2008 published by the U.S. Joint Forces Command and downloadable as a pdf here. I have modified it by adding the Chinese Navy's deployment off Somalia in its anti-piracy role (see here) where China can try out out of area operations in a relatively benign environment while observing/working with other navies (see China's "Maritime Chess').

Chokepoints, sea lines of communications - Navy work.

Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

Recent Attacks on Shipping (to 4 July 11)

Rough sea conditions in their main operating areas, along with the presence of naval forces and armed security guards on some merchant ships, have slowed the Somali pirates somewhat, however, there is still a whole lot of pirate-like activity around the world, as seen in the reports below.




From IMB's Live Piracy Reports

04.07.2011: 0415 LT: Posn: 06:05.9S – 106:53.0E, Tg. Priok port, Jakarta, Indonesia. Three robbers armed with knives boarded a berthed bulk carrier during discharging operations via the shore side cargo net. Duty crew noticed the robbers near the forward store and informed the D/O who raised the alarm. The duty crew tried to stop the robbers from stealing but was threatened with a knife. The robbers lowered the stolen properties into a small boat on the sea side and escaped.
01.07.2011: 2341 LT: Posn: 01:16.6N – 104:12.8E, around 3.7nm south of Tg. Ayam, Malaysia. Robbers in four fast moving boats attempted to board a bulk carrier underway. Alarm raised, fire hoses activated, all deck lights switched on, anti-piracy crew directed searchlights towards the boats, evasive manoeuvres carried out in the restricted TSS lane and VTIS Singapore informed. After several attempts, the boats aborted the attack and moved away.
01.07.2011: 1835 UTC: Posn: 01:31.6N – 104:32.2E, South China Sea. Duty officer onboard a tug towing a barge sighted three pirates armed with knives. Alarm raised and crew alerted. Upon hearing the alarm, the pirates escaped in their speed boat. A search was conducted and no pirates were found onboard and nothing was stolen. The tug continued her passage.(see below for ReCAAP discussion)
30.06.2011: 0630 UTC: Cat Lai anchorage, Vietnam. While at anchor, the duty officer onboard a container ship noticed two boats approaching the vessel. He instructed the duty ABs to investigate. The persons in the boat pretended to be fishermen trying to sell fish, phone cards fruits etc. The boat people engaged the Abs for nearly 30 minutes before moving away. It was later discovered that ship stores had been stolen from the forward stores. Attempts to contact port control was futile.
30.06.2011: 0205 UTC: Posn: 06:00N – 002:29E: Cotonou anchorage, Benin. Armed robbers in a speed boat boarded a product tanker during STS operations, stole ship’s and crew properties and escaped. For safe STS operations the vessel had to remove the razor wire surrounding the vessel. The robbers used this to their advantage and gained access to the vessel.
29.06.2011: 1530 UTC: Posn: 13:17N – 042:59E, around 21nm NE of Assab, Eritrea,Red Sea. Two skiffs with six pirates in each skiff approached a chemical tanker underway. Master raised alarm, crew alerted and commenced manoeuvring. At a distance of 100 meters a ladder and weapons were sighted in the skiff. Onboard security team fired warning shots and the pirates aborted the attack.
Earlier incident of RPG armed pirates 26.06.2011: 0910 UTC: Posn: 21:42N – 060:29E: Around 62nm SE of Ras al Hadd, Oman. (Off Somalia) Two skiffs with five pirates in each chased a bulk carrier underway. The pirates fired RPGs at the vessel. The pirates managed to hook on the ladder onto the ships rail however due to evasive manoeuvres and using sea and swell to advantage coupled with razor wire and response from coalition navies the pirates aborted the attempt and moved away. A grey hulled mother vessel approximately 40meters in length was reported in the vicinity.

From Maritime Safety Information:

Red arrows point to attacks

A. (U) GULF OF GUINEA: A chemical tanker was hijacked 26 June off of Cotonou, Benin.
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B. (U) ARABIAN SEA: Bulk carrier (SAGAR RATAN) experienced an attempted boarding 26 June approximately 72NM southeast of Sur, Oman.
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C. (U) GULF OF GUINEA: A tanker was robbed 24 June while anchored at the Cotonou anchorage, Benin.
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D. (U) GULF OF GUINEA: A chemical tanker was hijacked 24 June approximately 12NM southeast of Cotonou, Benin.
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E. (U) GULF OF GUINEA: A vessel was robbed 23 June approximately 11NM southeast of Cotonou, Benin.
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F. (U) ATLANTIC OCEAN: A refrigerated cargo vessel was robbed 23 June while anchored in the Matadi anchorage, Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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G. (U) INDONESIA: A bulk carrier was robbed 22 June while anchored in the Surabaya anchorage, Indonesia.

and more information from the Anti-Shipping Activity Messages

Oman area attack, all close together and on sea lane

Date of Occurrence: 06/26/2011 Reference Number: 2011-310 Geographical Subregion: 62 Geographical Location: 21° 42' 00" N 60° 29' 00" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: BULK CARRIER Description: RAS AL HADD, OMAN: Two skiffs with five pirates in each chased a bulk carrier underway. The pirates fired rpgs at the vessel. The pirates managed to hook on the ladder onto the ships rail however due to evasive maneuvers and using sea and swell to advantage coupled with razor wire and response from coalition navies the pirates aborted the attempt and moved away. A grey hulled mother vessel approximately 40 meters in length was reported in the vicinity.

Date of Occurrence: 06/26/2011 Reference Number: 2011-311 Geographical Subregion: 62 Geographical Location: 21° 45' 00" N 60° 31' 00" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: MERCHANT VESSEL Description: ARABIAN SEA: Merchant vessel attacked in vicinity 21-45N 060-31E at 0949z on 26 Jun. Vessels are advised to keep 100 miles clear of this position and to exercise extreme caution.

Date of Occurrence: 06/24/2011 Reference Number: 2011-309 Geographical Subregion: 57 Geographical Location: 6° 08' 35" N 2° 28' 16" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: MERCHANT VESSEL Description: 12 MILES OFF COTONOU, BENIN: Four robbers in a speed boat boarded the vessel. All crew went into the citadel, but robbers managed to capture the 2nd engineer before he could enter the citadel. Seeing this, the Master presented himself to the robbers as well. The robbers took the Master and 2nd engineer and stole ship's and crew's cash. Personal belongings were taken, during this time the Master and the 2nd engineer were also hit by the robbers. Port control was contacted but received no response. At the time of the incident the vessel was undergoing STS operations and had to remove the razor wire to enable smooth operations. The robbers took advantage of this and gained access to the vessel.

Date of Occurrence: 06/24/2011 Reference Number: 2011-307 Geographical Subregion: 62 Geographical Location: 21° 03' 00" N 60° 12' 00" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: CHEMICAL TANKER Description: 74 MILES EAST OF GHALAT, OMAN: Two skiffs with six pirates in each chased and attempted to attack a chemical tanker underway. Master raised alarm, increased speed and took evasive maneuvers. The onboard security fired warning shots resulting in the pirates aborting the attempted attack and moved towards their mother vessel. The mother vessel was observed picking up the two skiffs.

Date of Occurrence: 06/24/2011 Reference Number: 2011-306 Geographical Subregion: 57 Geographical Location: 6° 09' 35" N 2° 32' 00" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: CHEMICAL TANKER Description: COTONOU, BENIN: Twelve armed pirates boarded a chemical tanker drifting in preparation for STS operations. They took hostage all crewmembers and hijacked the tanker. The tanker was released after 17 hours. Awaiting further details.

Benin attacks

Date of Occurrence: 06/24/2011 Reference Number: 2011-308 Geographical Subregion: 57 Geographical Location: 6° 15' 54" N 2° 33' 24" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: TANKER Description: COTONOU ANCHORAGE, BENIN: About ten robbers armed with guns and knives in a speed boat were seen approaching an anchored tanker with STS fenders alongside. Duty officer raised alarm, activated the SSAS and called port control but received no response. Four robbers boarded the tanker via the STS fenders, entered the bridge and took the Master to his cabin and stole ship's cash and personal belongings. Later the duty officer was taken to his cabin as well as all the other crew cabins and stole crew personal belongings. At this time the crew were threatened. Some crew were also beaten. All the robbers left the tanker at 0330 local time. Port control was called again but there still was no answer.

DR of Congo Attack

Date of Occurrence: 06/23/2011 Reference Number: 2011-302 Geographical Subregion: 57 Geographical Location: 5° 52' 00" S 13° 24' 43" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: REFRIGERATED CARGO SHIP Description: MATADI ANCHORAGE, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Robbers boarded and stole ship stores from an anchored refrigerated cargo vessel on three occasions between 0500 local and 0740 local time. Duty crew spotted the robbers and raised the alarm on each occasion resulting in the robbers jumping overboard and escaping in a waiting boat. No response received from port authority when called on VHF. [Note by E1: Interesting as it appears to be a river attack]

Closer view of DR Congo reported attack area

Date of Occurrence: 06/23/2011 Reference Number: 2011-303 Geographical Subregion: 72 Geographical Location: 7° 11' 30" S 112° 43' 30" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: BULK CARRIER Description: SURABAYA ANCHORAGE, INDONESIA: Robbers boarded an anchored bulk carrier from the stern as the duty crew was taking routine rounds forward. They stole ship's stores and escaped. When the duty crew reached the stern, he found ship's stores missing and raised the alarm. Port control and local agents informed.

For those of you unfamiliar with it, ReCAAP is The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, an international agreement (and organization) devoted to fighting piracy in the Malacca Strait and other parts of the South Asian waters. Since its implementation, piracy in the area has decreased. ReCAAP keeps a watchful eye on the South China Sea, too, and recently, in a Special Report dated 29 June 11 (pdf download) that notes an apparent pattern of hijacking ocean going tugs:

5. A total of 11 incidents of hijacking and missing vessels were reported between

2008 and 2011, comprising two incidents in 2008, one incident in 2009, three incidents in 2010 and five incidents in 2011 (up to June 2011).
6. Except for the incident involving tanker Blue Ocean 7 on 21 May 08, all the other 10 incidents involved tug boats. Tug boats are vulnerable targets as they tend to operate nearer to coast (on coastal voyages), slow moving, with low free board and less crew onboard.

Vicinity of 1 July tug  attack off Malaysia (click to enlarge)

The report goes on to analyze the patterns, report the economic basis for the hijackings (newer boats preferred to old because they sell for more), suggest tug boat security rules and it has maps detailing the prime attack areas. Interesting read.

The 1 July thwarted attack set out  in red above appears to fall into this pattern of criminality.

You may recall the hijacked tug, Atlantic 5, found being renamed in the Philippines as set out in my post here.