VertRep

VertRep

Thursday, August 04, 2011

Happy Birthday, Coast Guard!

U.S. Coast Guard Celebrating 221 years of service :


On August 4, 1790, President George Washington put pen to paper and created the Revenue Cutter Service. That service of “a few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws” has grown into America’s maritime first responder. For 221 years, the United States Coast Guard has protected Americans on the sea, protected America from threats delivered by sea and protected the sea itself.

As the only military service with the ability to enforce laws within our borders and the only law enforcement agency authorized to enforce them outside our borders, the Coast Guard has evolved from its early beginnings but perhaps never so much as it has over the past decade. As America prepares to recognize the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Coast Guard men and women are deployed throughout the world sharing their expertise in border protection, drug interdiction and counter-terrorism with our allies while their Shipmates stand a taut watch protecting the homeland.
Well, however they got to it, thanks for being there, Coasties!

Wednesday, August 03, 2011

Shale Gas and U.S. National Security

A paper, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy from the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, "SHALE GAS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY":
The Baker Institute study "Shale Gas and U.S. National Security," sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, investigates the role that U.S. shale gas will play in global energy markets as global primary energy use shifts increasingly to natural gas. Specifically, the study concludes that shale gas will diminish the petro-power of major natural gas producers in the Middle East, Russia and Venezuela, and it will be a major factor limiting global dependence on natural gas supplies from the same unstable regions that are currently uncertain sources of the global supply of oil. In addition, the timely development of U.S. shale gas resources will limit the need for the United States to import liquefied natural gas for at least two decades, thereby reducing negative energy-related stress on the U.S. trade deficit and economy.
But, hey, don't take this summary as truth when you can read the source document by downloading it from here.

Here's an interesting section that points out how global energy markets work (click on it to enlarge it):

 Not only is shale gas important for U.S. national security, it's providing a benefit to Europe and Asia.

Damn right it will "have significant geopolitical ramifications."

And we have a lot of it, as set out here:

The U.S. Has Abundant Shale Gas Resources

Of the natural gas consumed in the United States in 2009, 87% was produced domestically; thus, the supply of natural gas is not as dependent on foreign producers as is the supply of crude oil, and the delivery system is less subject to interruption. The availability of large quantities of shale gas will further allow the United States to consume a predominantly domestic supply of gas.

According to the EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2011, the United States possesses 2,552 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of potential natural gas resources. Natural gas from shale resources, considered uneconomical just a few years ago, accounts for 827 Tcf of this resource estimate, more than double the estimate published last year.

Enough for 110 Years of Use

At the 2009 rate of U.S. consumption (about 22.8 Tcf per year), 2,552 Tcf of natural gas is enough to supply approximately 110 years of use. Shale gas resource and production estimates increased significantly between the 2010 and 2011 Outlook reports and are likely to increase further in the future.
So, why, instead of screwing around with ethanol and really expensive electric cars, are we not working hard to produce vehicles powered by shale and other natural gas?

U.S. Energy Information Agency study, Review of Emerging Resources: U.S. Shale Gas and Shale Oil Plays":
Although the U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA) National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) and energy projections began representing shale gas resource development and production in the mid-1990s, only in the past 5 years has shale gas been recognized as a "game changer" for the U.S. natural gas market. The proliferation of activity into new shale plays has increased dry shale gas production in the United States from 1.0 trillion cubic feet in 2006 to 4.8 trillion cubic feet, or 23 percent of total U.S. dry natural gas production, in 2010. Wet shale gas reserves increased to about 60.64 trillion cubic feet by year-end 2009, when they comprised about 21 percent of overall U.S. natural gas reserves, now at the highest level since 1971. Oil production from shale plays, notably the Bakken Shale in North Dakota and Montana, has also grown rapidly in recent years.
You can thank the engineers who developed the technology and techniques to make this possible.

Run him for political office . . .


. . . perhaps that's the answer to the song "What do we do with a drunken sailor?"

Tuesday, August 02, 2011

Speaking of Chokepoints

Just the other day I posted Refresher: World Trade Route Chokepoints and now comes along a related piece from George Friedman at STRATFOR, his recognition about Indonesia's position on major sea lanes and chokepoints and the problems that poses for . . . China at Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance (his words in blue - I added the maps):
I am writing this from Indonesia. Actually, that is not altogether a fair statement. I am at the moment in Bali and just came from Jakarta. The two together do not come close to being Indonesia. Jakarta, the capital, is a vast city that is striking to me for its traffic. It takes an enormous amount of time to get anywhere in Jakarta. Like most cities, it was not built to accommodate cars, and the mix of cars with motor scooters results in perpetual gridlock. It is also a city of extraordinary dynamism. There is something happening on almost every street. And in the traffic jams, you have time to contemplate those streets in detail.

Bali is an island of great beauty, complete with mountains, white beaches, blue waters and throngs of tourists. Since I am one of those tourists, I will not trouble you with the usual tourist nonsense of wanting to be in a place where there are no tourists. The hypocrisy of tourists decrying commercialization is tedious. I am here for the beaches, and they are expensive. The locals with whom tourists claim to want to mingle can’t come into the resort, and tourists leaving the resort will have trouble finding locals who are not making a living off the tourists. As always, the chance of meeting “locals” as tourists usually define them — people making little money in picturesque ways — is not easy.

What is clear in both Jakarta and Bali is that the locals are tired of picturesque poverty, however much that disappoints the tourists. They want to live better and, in particular, they want their children to live better. We were driven by a tour guide to places where we bought what my wife assures me is art (my own taste in art runs to things in museums and tigers made of velvet). We spent the requisite money on art at places our guide delivered us to, I assume for suitable compensation.

The guide was interesting. His father was a rice farmer who owned some land, and now he is a tour guide, which in Bali, I gather, is not a bad job by any means if you have deals with the hotel (which he undoubtedly has). But it was his children who fascinated me. He had three sons, two of whom were in universities. The movement from rice farmer to university student in three generations is not trivial. That it happened with the leaders Indonesia had during that time is particularly striking, since by all reasonable measures these leaders have been, until recently, either rigidly ideological (Sukarno) or breathtakingly self-serving (Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati).

When I looked at some of Indonesia’s economic statistics, the underlying reason for this emerged. Since 1998, when Indonesia had its meltdown, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at roughly 5 percent per year, an amount substantial, consistent and above all sustainable, unlike the 8 and 9 percent growth rates before the collapse. Indonesia is now the 18th largest economy in the world, ranking just behind Turkey.

All of that is nice, but for this: Indonesia ranks 109th in per capita GDP. Indonesia’s population is about 237 million. Its fertility rate is only 2.15 births per woman, just above a stable population — though being just above stable still means substantial growth. Indonesia is a poor country, albeit not as poor as it was, and its GDP continues to rise. Given its stable government and serious efforts to control corruption, which systemically diverts wealth away from the general population, this growth can continue. But whether the stability and anti-corruption efforts of the past six years can continue is an open question, as is the prosperity in Jakarta, the tourism in Bali (recall the jihadist attacks there in 2002 and 2005) and whether our guide’s third son will receive a college education.

I saw three Indonesias (and I can assure you there are hundreds more). One was the Indonesia of Jakarta’s elite, Westernized and part of the global elite found in most capitals that is critical for managing any country’s rise to some degree of prosperity. Jakarta’s elite will do well from that prosperity, make no mistake, but they are also indispensable to it. Another Indonesia was the changing one that our upwardly mobile tour guide saw through his children’s eyes. The third was the one in which a little girl, perhaps four, begged in traffic on the road from the airport in Bali. I have seen these things in many countries and it is difficult to know what to make of them yet. For me, going to Indonesia is not the same as going to Eastern Europe. I know what is lurking under the current there. Indonesia is new for me, and I will be back. For now, let me describe to you not so much the country of Indonesia but how I try to learn about a place I know only from books (and even then relatively little).

Strategic Positions

Nietzsche once said that modern man eats knowledge without hunger. What he meant by that is that modern man learns without passion and without necessity. I didn’t go to Indonesia without either. What interests me most about Indonesia is not its economy or its people — although that might change as I learn more. What interests me now is Indonesia’s strategic position in the world at this point in time.

To determine that position, we must first look at China. China is building an aircraft carrier. Now, one aircraft carrier without cruisers, destroyers, submarines, anti-missile systems, satellite-targeting capabilities, mid-ocean refueling capabilities and a thousand other things is simply a ship waiting to be sunk. Nevertheless, it could be the nucleus of something more substantial in the coming decades (not years).

From Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (National Defense University (pdf))
When I look at a map of China’s coast I am constantly struck by how contained China is. In the north, where the Yellow and East China seas provide access to Shanghai and Qingdao (the home of China’s northern naval fleet), access to the Pacific is blocked by the line of Japan-Okinawa-Taiwan and the islands between Okinawa and Japan. Bases there are not the important point. The important point is that the Chinese naval — or merchant — fleet must pass through choke points that can be controlled by the United States, hundreds of miles to the east. The situation is even worse for China in the South China Sea, which is completely boxed in by the line of Taiwan-Philippines-Indonesia-Singapore, and worse still when you consider the emerging naval cooperation between the United States and Vietnam, which has no love for the Chinese.

The Chinese are trying to solve this problem by building ports in Pakistan and Myanmar. They say these are for commercial use, and I believe them. Isolated ports at such a distance, with tenuous infrastructure connecting them to China and with sea-lane control not assured, are not very useful. They work in peacetime but not during war, and it is war, however far-fetched, that navies are built for.

China’s biggest problem is not that it lacks aircraft carriers; it is that it lacks an amphibious capability. Even if it could, for example, fight its way across the Formosa Strait to Taiwan (a dubious proposition), it is in no position to supply the multi-divisional force needed to conquer Taiwan. The Chinese could break the blockade by seizing Japan, Okinawa or Taiwan, but that isn’t going to happen.

What could happen is China working to gain an economic toehold in the Philippines or Indonesia, and using that economic leverage to support political change in those countries. A change in the political atmosphere would not by itself permit the Chinese navy to break into the Pacific or eliminate the American ability to blockade Chinese merchant ships. The United States doesn’t need land bases to control the passages through either of these countries from a distance.

Rather, what would change the game is if China, having reached an economic entente with either country, was granted basing privileges there. That would permit the Chinese to put aircraft and missiles on the islands, engage the U.S. Navy outside the barrier formed by the archipelagos and force the U.S. Navy back, allowing free passage.

Now, this becomes much more complicated when we consider U.S. countermeasures. China already has massive anti-ship missiles on its east coast. The weakness of these missiles is intelligence and reconnaissance. In order to use those missiles the Chinese have to have a general idea of where their targets are, and ships move around a lot. That reconnaissance must come from survivable aircraft (planes that won’t be destroyed when they approach the U.S. fleet) and space-based assets — along with the sophisticated information architecture needed to combine the sensor with the shooter.

The United States tends to exaggerate the strength of its enemies. This can be a positive trait because it means extra exertion. In the Cold War, U.S. estimates of Soviet capabilities outstripped Soviet realities. There are many nightmare scenarios about China’s capabilities circulating, but we suspect that most are overstated. China’s ambitions outstrip its capabilities. Still, you prepare for the worst and hope for the best.

In this case, the primary battlefield is not yet the passages through the archipelago. It is the future of our Indonesian driver’s third child. If he gets to go to college, the likelihood of Indonesia succumbing to Chinese deals is limited. The history of Chinese-Indonesian relations is not particularly good, and little short of desperation would force an alliance. American Pacific strategy should be based on making certain that neither Indonesia nor the Philippines is desperate.

A Focus of History

Indonesia has another dimension, of course. It is the largest Muslim country in the world, and one that has harbored and defeated a significant jihadist terrorist group. As al Qaeda crumbles, the jihadist movement may endure. The United States has an ongoing interest in this war and therefore has an interest in Indonesian stability and its ability to suppress radical Islam inside its borders and, above all, prevent the emergence of an Indonesian-based al Qaeda with an intercontinental capability.

Thus, Indonesia becomes a geopolitical focus of three forces — China, Islamists and the United States. This isn’t the first time Indonesia has been a focus of history. In 1941, Japan launched the attack on Pearl Harbor to paralyze the American fleet there and facilitate seizing what was then called the Netherlands East Indies for its supplies of oil and other raw materials. In the first real resource war — World War II — Indonesia was a pivot. Similarly, during the Cold War, the possibility of a Communist Indonesia was frightening enough to the United States that it ultimately supported the removal of Sukarno as president. Indonesia has mattered in the past, and it matters now.

The issue is how to assure a stable Indonesia. If the threat — however small — rests in China, so does the solution. Chinese wage rates are surging and Chinese products are becoming less competitive in the global marketplace. The Chinese have wanted to move up the economic scale from being an exporter of low-cost industrial products to being a producer of advanced technologies. As the recent crash of China’s high-speed train shows, China is a long way from achieving that goal.

There is no question that China is losing its export edge in low-grade industrial products. One of the reasons Western investors liked China was that a single country and a single set of relationships allowed them to develop production facilities that could supply them with products. All the other options aside from India, which has its own problems, can handle only a small fraction of China’s output. Indonesia, with nearly a quarter-billion people still in a low-wage state, can handle more.

The political risk has substantially declined in the last few years. If it continues to drop, Indonesia will become an attractive alternative to China at a time when Western companies are looking for alternatives. That would energize Indonesia’s economy and further stabilize the regime. A more stable Indonesian regime would remove any attraction for an alignment with China and any opportunities for Chinese or Islamist subversion — even if, in the latter case, prosperity is not enough to eliminate it.

When we look at a map, we see the importance of Indonesia. When we look at basic economic statistics, we see the strength and weakness of Indonesia. When we consider the role of China in the world economy and its current problems, we see Indonesia’s opportunities. But it comes down to this: If my guide’s third son can go to college, and little girls no longer have to dart into traffic and beg, Indonesia has a strong future, and that future depends on it becoming the low-cost factory to the world.

Life is more complex than that, of course, but it is the beginning of understanding the possibilities. In the end, few rational people looking at China in 1975 would have anticipated China in 2011. That unexpected leap is what Indonesia needs and what will determine its geopolitical role. But these are my first thoughts on Indonesia. I will need to come back here many times for any conclusions.

Read more: Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance | STRATFOR
In my recent refresher post on chokepoints, I pointed out that they don't change position - what is a chokepoint today will be one tomorrow, and was one in the past. As a proof of this proposition, take a look at the map below, which shows how the Japanese were planning to protect the vital sea lanes and chokepoints of their empire in 1941:

From the University of Texas Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection
You might want to take a look at China: Sri Lanka and the Chinese String of Pearls
and the links therein. From that post:
Map is from JOE 2008 published by the U.S. Joint Forces Command and downloadable as a pdf here. I have modified it by adding the Chinese Navy's deployment off Somalia in its anti-piracy role (see here) where China can try out out of area operations in a relatively benign environment while observing/working with other navies (see China's "Maritime Chess').


Chokepoints, sea lines of communications - Navy work.

Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

Monday, August 01, 2011

Drug Submarines: First Interception Of “Drug Sub” In Caribbean




A US Coast Guard report of a drug semi-submersible being caught in the Caribbean at First interdiction of Western Caribbean drug sub and underwater recovery:
Diver recovering drugs
The crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Seneca, a medium-endurance cutter homeported in Boston, interdicted a drug smuggling, self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessel in the western Caribbean Sea July 13.

Used regularly to transport illegal narcotics in the Eastern Pacific, this interdiction is the first interdiction of an SPSS in the Caribbean and the first underwater drug removal of an SPSS.

A C-130 fixed-wing aircrew spotted a suspicious vessel and notified U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) maritime patrol airplane to further investigate. The CBP crew spotted the SPSS while on patrol and alerted the Seneca crew of the location.


With the assistance of the CBP airplane, a Seneca-based Coast Guard helicopter crew and pursuit boatcrew interdicted the SPSS and detained its crew. The SPSS sank during the interdiction, but not before a quantity of cocaine was recovered.

Recovered drugs
The Seneca crewmembers commenced searching for the sunken SPSS on July 13. Several Coast Guard Cutters, the Honduran Navy and FBI dive teams conducted multiple search patterns. The SPSS was located by the crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Oak on July 26 using side-sonar equipment.

"The U.S. Coast Guard greatly appreciates the support and cooperation of the Honduran authorities as we worked together to recover the drugs from the sunken SPSS," said Capt. Brendan McPherson, Seventh Coast Guard District chief of enforcement. "In addition, the technical expertise of the FBI dive team was instrumental in the success of this unique operation in international waters, far from U.S. shores, that ultimately prevented tons of cocaine from reaching our streets and neighborhoods."

The FBI Laboratory's Technical Dive Team from Quantico, Va., was able to recover nearly 15,000 pounds of contraband worth an estimated street value of $180 million from the sunken SPSS.

"Working on a buoy deck is dangerous enough; but this unique mission involved blending dive operations, boat operations, and deck operations at the same time," said Lt. Cmdr. Peter Niles, commanding officer of the cutter Oak. "The equipment the FBI brought to the Oak and their dive teams were essential to locate the SPSS and recover its cargo."

Built in the FARC-controlled jungles of Colombia, the typical SPSS is less than 100 feet in length, with 4-5 crewmembers, and carrying up to 10 metric tons of illicit cargo for distances up to 5,000 miles. Drug traffickers design SPSS to rapidly sink when they detect law enforcement thereby making contraband recovery difficult. SPSS are responsible for the movement of nearly one-third of all cocaine in the transit zone.

"I am very proud of the brave efforts of the crew to stop the SPSS, apprehend the smugglers and obtain evidence prior to the vessel sinking," said Cmdr. Charles Fosse, commanding officer of the cutter Seneca. "The teamwork of the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection and Joint Interagency Taskforce South personnel during this case was excellent and it is gratifying to see this crew's exceptional skills, persistence and hard work yield such tangible results with direct impact on our communities back home."

The U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, CBP, Joint Interagency Task Force South, and partner nation aircraft and vessels work together to conduct counter drug patrols in the Caribbean.

"Medium-endurance cutters like the Seneca are built for sustained offshore patrols including those that require enhanced communications, and helicopter and pursuit boat operations such as this, they provide a key capability for the nation's homeland security operations at sea and allow us to fight the threats to our homeland security before they arrive at our doorstep," said Rear Adm. William Baumgartner, commander of the Seventh Coast Guard District headquartered in Miami. "Our goal is to interdict cocaine at sea when it is still concentrated in large loads before those drugs can be broken into small loads and smuggled across our border with Mexico."

The case is under investigation. The contraband will be turned over later to other U.S. law enforcement agencies for disposition.

Red arrow point to general area of sub sinking

Refresher: World Trade Route Chokepoints

Every now and then it's a good idea to get back to basics and refresh ourselves on basic principles. In this post, I revisit one of the reasons why we have a navy and why navies are important. "Revisit" because I have done this before Sea Lines of Communication or Sea Lanes .

Closely tied to sea lines of communication are "chokepoints" - and there is no better illustration of these vital places on the planet than this article from the U.S. Energy Information Agency in its look at trade route "tight places" - with an emphasis on oil - at World Oil Transit Chokepoints:
World oil transit chokepoints are a critical part of global energy security. About half of the world s oil production moves on maritime routes.
Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes, some so narrow that restrictions are placed on the size of vessel that can navigate through them. They are a critical part of global energy security due to the high volume of oil traded through their narrow straits.
Blue arrows point to chokepoints
***
In 2009, total world oil production amounted to approximately 84 million barrels per day (bbl/d), and about one-half was moved by tankers on fixed maritime routes. With the onset of the global economic downturn that began in mid-2008, world oil demand declined, and along with it the volumes of oil shipped to markets, both via pipelines and along maritime routes such as these chokepoints. By volume of oil transit, the Strait of Hormuz leading out of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans are two of the world s most strategic chokepoints.
For more fun reading about chokepoints, see Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (National Defense University (pdf)) which is about 15 years old (but then it's not like the chokepoints move around much, it it?), from which come another couple of illustrations of chokepoints and the flow of commerce.


A "SLOC" is a "Sea Line of Communication" - and a vital thing to keep open in time of war and peace. As you might imagine, sealing off "chokepoints" on a SLOC pretty much puts that SLOC out of use.

Now, suppose you wanted to cut off the flow of oil to Japan - where would you place submarines or ships or aircraft to impose that embargo with the least expenditure of equipment and personnel? Could it be done solely by shore bases? By aircraft?

How about Somali pirates - what key SLOCs and chokepoints can they interfere with? See Where the Somali Pirates Operate and Why, where I put this up:
That's an overlay of shipping lane usage and pirate attacks. You should note that most of the attacks occur as ships leave one chokepoint and are en route to another. This overlay was done in February 2011. A more current version, which I may get to soon, will show an increasing number of attacks around the Bab el Mandeb at the lower end of the Red Sea.

There are alternatives to the Red Sea/Suez Canal route - but they are longer.  See below for a graphic illustration of that point which I stole liberated from someone who should get credit for it.

Should the Southeast Asia chokepoints become closed, there are alternatives for Japan, too, like sending ships on routes to take them across the sometimes ice free Arctic route (see here) or sending ships down below Australia and out into the Pacific. Money and time, though, are both eaten up in using alternate routes.

Better to keep chokepoints and SLOCs open.

How?

That's why we have a Navy.

Sunday, July 31, 2011

Somali Pirates: Death Threats - Nothing Changes

Shiptalk and others (see gCaptain) -report a Somali pirate "Killing Pledge":
It is increasingly being reported that pirates are changing their attitude and as they look to apply every greater pressure to get ransoms paid they are claiming that ”killing hostages has now become part of the rules”. According to media reports, the pirates are stating that if a rescue is attempted they will immediately kill hostages.
So, how is that a change in the status quo? I have always assumed that the only thing keeping the pirates on captured vessels alive was the threat they pose to the hostage crews they hold. Otherwise, a team of special forces boards the ships and it's "AMF" to the pirates.

So, not much news here in my view. Sometimes the level of media cluelessness amazes me. After all, these same pirates are shooting weapons at ship crews already, almost like they would mean to kill someone.

Perhaps we should warn the pirates that if they start killing hostages we are going visit their home villages with malice. Malice like this:

Photo from Spectre Association


That might be too threatening, though.

Saturday, July 30, 2011

Maritime Security: Arctic Unpreparedness

The U. S. Coast Guard Commandant points out a problem with our ability to operate in the Arctic, where vast new resources may lie as noted in Admiral Papp: USCG Not Ready for Arctic:
“Operations in the Arctic’s extreme cold, darkness and ice-infested waters require specialized equipment, infrastructure and training. Our current Arctic capabilities are very limited. We have only one operational ice breaker. We do not have any coastal or shoreside infrastructure. Nor do we have a seasonal base to hanger our aircraft or sustain our crews.”
Refreshing honesty. If the U.S. Navy had a rep there, he or she would have had to echo and add to Admiral Papp's comments because the Navy lacks even a single ice breaker . . .

This has been looked at before on this site. See The Northeast Passage -Shorter, Faster, Avoids Somali Pirates and Adds to Maritime Security Concerns and Land rush under the ice and the links therein.

You may note that the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia all border the Arctic Ocean.

Full text of Admiral Papp's comments:
Papp

In a perfect world, everyone would play nice in the Arctic and there would never be any accidents or other events that the Coast Guard should respond to. However, . . .

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Somali Pirates: Sympathy is a tough sell . . .


A piece reporting on a book contains this look at how the pirates view themselves -
"Somalia's pirates don't see themselves as pirates. Displaying admirable public relations savvy, they call themselves "saviors of the sea" or "coast guards.""
- found at Do Somali pirates have legitimate gripe? get short shrift from some of the paper's readers in the comments section to the article. Sample comments:
"Unarmed ships are attacked and seized in international waters. Including pleasure vessels. Ransom is demanded. Sounds like piracy to me."

"OK so we'll paint "saviors of the sea" on the side of the next torpedo."

"Not many things us Americans agree on, but this could be it. Pirates of any country should be hounded, chased and killed."
It looks like that "admirable public relations savvy" faces a really tough sell in trying to make this about "truth, justice and the 'Somali pirate way.'"

I wonder where the report is on how the 400 or so hostages being held by the pirates feel about the Somali "saviors of the sea?"

Monday, July 25, 2011

Pirates of the Gulf of Guinea

Area circled in red is Gulf of Guinea
Italian tanker Anema e Core seized by pirates off Benin:
Pirates have hijacked an Italian diesel tanker off Benin in western Africa in an attack of the kind more usually associated with Somalia.

Assailants boarded the RBD Anema e Core early on Sunday in the Gulf of Guinea, officials in Benin and Italy confirmed.

***
Benin's navy said it was following the hijacked ship while Italy's foreign ministry liaised with its owner in Naples.

Three pirates managed to board the ship 23 nautical miles (43km) south of Cotonou, the economic capital of Benin, Italian media said.

"Everything is being done to trace the pirates as quickly as possible," Maxime Ahoyo, commander of Benin's navy, told reporters in Cotonou.

The Gulf of Guinea has become increasingly important for its potential energy reserves which have attracted international interests, BBC West Africa correspondent Thomas Fessy reports from Dakar.
If this is a new trend, it's worrisome.

Saturday, July 23, 2011

Psychics in the Navy?

Who really knows the amazing powers of Navy men?

From an naval officer who blogs at The Mellow Jihadi, a look into the amazing world of Navy "psychics" in You Gettin’ Anything?.

Now, go get me a bucket of steam and a can of relative bearing grease. We need to get ready for the mail buoy.

US Coast Guard: Island Rescue

Island where missing party was found
Reported as 15 rescued after stranded on a Pacific island :
When nine adults and six children left on their 28-foot skiff from Chuuk State to Ruo Island in the Federated States of Micronesia, they didn’t expect to run into problems. But when they didn’t arrive as planned, a search began immediately thanks to their careful planning.

“Filing of a float plan with family or friends should be a part of every boater’s routine,” said Leif Wigman-Nilsson, a watchstander at Coast Guard Sector Guam. “In this case, the concerned parties ashore were well aware of when this vessel was to depart, when it was to arrive and the route that it was taking. This information was key to getting the Coast Guard and other rescue agencies into the right place at the right time to effect this rescue.”
Arrow points to general area of rescue (click to enlarge)

After more than 76 hours of searching across more than 18,000 miles, their boat was found overturned near an island, which was approximately eight miles from their original destination. All 15 boaters were found safe and in good health on the small uninhabited atoll.

An HC-130 Hercules airplane from Air Station Barbers Point, Oahu, Hawaii and a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion long-range search aircraft from Okinawa, Japan, along with commercial mariners transiting the area, several local boaters and other international partners conducted the joint international search effort.

“This type of coordination makes immediate searches possible in a search and rescue area of responsibility that mirrors the size of the continental United States,” said Lt. Gregg Maye, chief of Sector Guam’s command center.

Once word spread that the missing people were found, other local boaters came to their aid providing them food and water. The Coast Guard Cutter Assateague arrived on scene early this morning to rescue the survivors.
BZ to everyone involved!

Friday, July 22, 2011

Christmas Tsunami of 2004 Worsened by "Stiff Sediments"

From Wikipedia
Odd geological formation made the 2004 tsunami worse, according to research reported by the University of Texas in "Stiff Sediments Made 2004 Sumatra Earthquake Deadliest in History" :
An international team of geoscientists has discovered an unusual geological formation that helps explain how an undersea earthquake off the coast of Sumatra in December 2004 spawned the deadliest tsunami in recorded history.

Instead of the usual weak, loose sediments typically found above the type of geologic fault that caused the earthquake, the team found a thick plateau of hard, compacted sediments. Once the fault snapped, the rupture was able to spread from tens of kilometers below the seafloor to just a few kilometers below the seafloor, much farther than weak sediments would have permitted. The extra distance allowed it to move a larger column of seawater above it, unleashing much larger tsunami waves.

"The results suggest we should be concerned about locations with large thicknesses of sediments in the trench, especially those which have built marginal plateaus," said Sean Gulick, research scientist at The University of Texas at Austin's Institute for Geophysics. "These may promote more seaward rupture during great earthquakes and a more significant tsunami."

Thursday, July 21, 2011

Pirate Attacks: Red Sea and Bab al Mandab

Pirate attacks continue in the Gulf of Aden areas, although the continuing high winds appear to be posing a problem for pirates in all but a few areas.

Recent NATO map of attacks:

The reddish areas show most recent attacks, listed below from NATO Shipping Centre (numnwsvwb2): SOMALIA PIRACY UPDATE as of 21 JULY 2011:
21 JULY 2011
Latitude: 13'29 N Longitude: 042' 36E
Vessel "MV F Blue" was attacked by armed skiff at approximately 1118Z. Skiff in F BLUE attack described as white hull with red zig zag on side of vessel. Skiff was reported having 8 POB. Last position of skiff 1330N 04235E.
_____________________________________

JULY 20, 2011
Latitude: 1327 N Longitude: 04239 E
Alert Number 204 / 2011
Alert Type: ATTACK
---WARNING WARNING WARNING---
On 20 JUL 2011 at 1548 UTC, a merchant vessel was fired upon by 6 pirates in a skiff at position 1327 N 04239E.
*** The vessel managed to evade hijack ***
The Pirate Attack Group is still in the area.














Tuesday, July 19, 2011

China and the South China Sea: Back to the "Cow's Tongue"

Red dashed line is the "Cow's Tongue"
There are a couple of things floating about the internet involving China and its assertion of claims to a large chunk of the South China Sea - a topic that I remind you has been discussed here and on Midrats on several occasions (see China: "The Cow's Tongue", Midrats (Dr. Michael Auslin in first part of show) and, more recently, A War of Words Over the South China Sea).

Senator James Webb has taken on this South China Sea issue as "America's Munich Moment":
So when the senator opines that the United States is ‘approaching a Munich moment with China’ in the South China Sea, it’s worth taking his words seriously.

He levels an incendiary charge. If this is a Munich moment in the making, who are the protagonists? Webb seemingly casts China in the part of Nazi Germany, an aggressive, acquisitive power bent on increasing its geopolitical sway at small states’ expense. This makes President Hu Jintao the counterpart to German dictator Adolf Hitler. President Barack Obama plays the part of Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister who traded away much of Czechoslovakia in 1938 in the hope of slaking Hitler’s land hunger.
***
Americans seldom follow Southeast Asian politics, despite the importance of this maritime crossroads to US and global commerce. Filipino leaders maintain that the 1951 security treaty between Manila and Washington covers maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea. Would Americans fight to defend such claims, or are they, like Czech sovereignty for the Western powers in 1938, a secondary affair?

As noted here. the U.S. Senate has taken a stand on the South China Sea by passing a resolution condemning the use of force in the disputed waters in Southeast Asia. See, from Senator Webb's website, U.S. Senate Unanimously “Deplores” China’s Use of Force in South China Sea:
The text of S.Res.217 is below:

Title: Calling for a peaceful and multilateral resolution to maritime territorial disputes in Southeast Asia.

Whereas, on June 9, 2011, 3 vessels from China, including 1 fishing vessel and 2 maritime security vessels, ran into and disabled the cables of an exploration ship from Vietnam, the VIKING 2;
Whereas that use of force occurred within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam, an area recognized as its Exclusive Economic Zone;
Whereas, on May 26, 2011, a maritime security vessel from China cut the cables of another exploration ship from Vietnam, the BINH MINH, in the South China Sea in waters near Cam Ranh Bay;
Whereas, in March 2011, the Government of the Philippines reported that patrol boats from China attempted to ram 1 of its surveillance ships;
Whereas those incidents occurred within disputed maritime territories of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, composed of 21 islands and atolls, 50 submerged land atolls, and 28 partly submerged reefs over an area of 340,000 square miles, and the Paracel Islands, a smaller group of islands located south of China’s Hainan Island;
Whereas China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei have disputed territorial claims over the Spratly Islands, and China and Vietnam have a disputed claim over the Paracel Islands;
Whereas the Government of China claims most of the 648,000 square miles of the South China Sea, more than any other nation involved in those territorial disputes;
Whereas, in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China signed a declaration on the code of conduct of parties in the South China Sea;
Whereas that declaration committed all parties to those territorial disputes to “reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea” and to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force”;
Whereas the South China Sea contains vital commercial shipping lines and points of access between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean;
Whereas, although not a party to these disputes, the United States has a national economic and a security interest in ensuring that no party uses force unilaterally to assert maritime territorial claims in East Asia;
Whereas, in September 2010, the Government of China also deliberately provoked a controversy within the waters of the Senkaku Islands, territory under the legal administration of Japan in the East China Sea;
Whereas the actions of the Government of China in the South China Sea have also affected United States military and maritime vessels transiting through international air space and waters, including the collision of a fighter plane of the Government of China with a United States surveillance plane in 2001, the harassment of the USNS IMPECCABLE in March 2009, and the collision of a Chinese submarine with the sonar cable of the USS JOHN MCCAIN in June 2009;
Whereas, like every nation, the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation and open access to the maritime commons of Asia;
Whereas the Government of the United States expressed support for the declaration by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China in 2002 on the code of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, and supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion;
Whereas the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation and in unimpeded economic development and commerce;
Whereas, on October 11, 2010, Secretary Gates maintained “The United States has always exercised our rights and supported the rights of others to transit through, and operate in, international waters.”;
Whereas, on June 3, 2011, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary Gates stated that “[m]aritime security remains an issue of particular importance for the region, with questions about territorial claims and the appropriate use of the maritime domain presenting on-going challenges to regional stability and prosperity”;
Whereas, on June 4, 2011, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Liang Guanglie, the Defense Minister from China, said, “China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea.”;
Whereas, on June 11, 2011, the Government of Vietnam held a live-fire military exercise on the uninhabited island of Hon Ong, 25 miles off the coast of Vietnam in the South China Sea; and
Whereas, on June 11, 2011, Hong Lei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman of China, stated, “[China] will not resort to force or the threat of force” to resolve the territorial dispute: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate—
(1) reaffirms the strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and pledges continued efforts to facilitate a multilateral, peaceful process to resolve these disputes;
(2) deplores the use of force by naval and maritime security vessels from China in the South China Sea;
(3) calls on all parties to the territorial dispute to refrain from threatening force or using force to assert territorial claims; and
(4) supports the continuation of operations by the United States Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international waters and air space in the South China Sea.
Now comes Vietnam to assert its complaints against China's encroachment into what it asserts are Vietnamese waters, in The East Sea: Seizing opportunity, getting out of danger:
If we look at the map of the East Sea, the territorial water sovereignty of each country and the international maritime order have been clearly clarified under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS).

China's Nine-Dotted Line Map
But why China dares to put forward the U-shape line to claim up to 80 percent of the East Sea – which could only happen if the wheel of history have reversed to the time before the World War II; when Vietnam, the Philippines and the countries around the East Sea were not recognized as independent nations and when Vietnamese, Filipino and other peoples did not have independence and freedom?
***
In that context, China has two options: 1) Cooperating with other super powers in the world, led by the US, to supply goods for maintaining the international order, the stability and prosperity development based on cooperation and global trade; 2) replacing the US and the US’ strategic allies (West Europe and Japan) to set up the new world order and new military alliance headed by the US in order to force others to obey the new order.

In fact, China has chosen the second. This process began by trampling on the UNCLOS in order to turn the East Sea into its pond. It is uneasy for China to realize that ambition because: 1) it abolishes the sovereignty of countries around the East Sea and goes on the contrary with the trend of the time (the campaign to struggle for independence for nations after the fascism was defeated). 2) In the long run, it can make a bad precedent for appropriating the rights of free navigation and maritime safety on international sea routes. Other countries (except for China) will have to pay fees or be fined or banned from using international sea routes or air routes, which are controlled by China.

The key point here is the clear difference between international maritime routes and maritime routes in China’s waters. When politic or interest conflicts occur, China can use its control right to ban related countries from traveling in the East Sea, though in principle, China commits maintaining free navigation. This will not happen if China cannot impose its real control on the waters bordered by the U-shape line.

The sovereignty disputes in the East Sea are not a bilateral matter, but the issue of regional and international security. China understands it very clearly and China understands that the US, Japan, West Europe and other superpowers in the world, like Russia and India also know its plot.

This game shows adventure in the strategy that China is pursuing. Carefully analyzing that game will create international agreement to solve the East Sea disputes, which China makes up into “bilateral conflicts” on the “indisputable sovereignty” in which China is the victim.
Now, with heads turning toward the U.S. to be a presence, ask yourself, "What fleet do we need?"

And, make no mistake, this is all about naval power and power projection.

Publicity Seekers Get Stopped by Israeli Sea Blockade

Dignite/Al Karama off some shore somewhere
After only getting 10% of their 10 boat publicity "flotilla" (that's 1 boat) to sail toward Gaza, international publicity seekers were stunned to find out that Israel means it when it announces that it is continuing to enforce a sea blockade off Gaza as reported in Israeli navy surrounds Gaza-bound French yacht. Even better, the boat seems to be suffering some sort of communication blackout so that international publicity seeking whining cannot be heard or seen live:
Israeli warships on Tuesday surrounded a French yacht carrying pro-Palestinian activists as they neared the coast of Gaza in a bid to breach the Israeli blockade, an organiser told AFP.

Organisers said Israeli navy vessels had surrounded the Dignite/Al Karama in international waters, some 40 nautical miles off the Gaza shoreline, at around 0630 GMT and all communications were cut shortly afterwards.

News that Israel had stopped the ship was roundly denounced by Gaza's Hamas rulers, who decried it as "a new act of Zionist piracy."

"The boat is surrounded by at least three Israeli ships and since 9:06 am (0706 GMT) all the communications have been jammed. We can't get in touch with them by phone or by Internet," French organiser Julien Rivoire told AFP by phone from Paris.

In a separate statement, the organisers urged the French government "to take its responsibilities and to protect the passengers, and to call on Israel not resort to violence."

The Israeli military confirmed it had made contact with the boat, which is carrying 16 people, including three crew members and three journalists.

"The Israel navy is currently in a dialogue with the activists on board the Al Karama in an attempt to dissuade them from continuing on their route into an area under a maritime security blockade," a statement said.

"The Israel navy will allow the organisers and passengers to re-route at any point, prior to the boarding of Israel navy soldiers."

Activists on board the ship were told they will not be allowed to reach Gaza under any circumstances and advised to change course for the Egyptian port of El-Arish, an Israeli military source told AFP.

"They contacted the boat and said: 'We won't let you reach Gaza under any circumstances, but you can head for El-Arish if you want,'" he quoted the naval commandos as saying.

The international political effort and the other efforts (see also here) leading up to the sailing of this one boat and the non-sailing of the other 9 has been interesting to watch. For those of you unfamiliar with the "law" of blockade, read this from the San Remo Manual setting out the appropriate blockade rules for parties to an armed conflict:
SECTION II : METHODS OF WARFARE
Blockade
93. A blockade shall be declared and notified to all belligerents and neutral States. 94. The declaration shall specify the commencement, duration, location, and extent of the blockade and the period within which vessels of neutral States may leave the blockaded coastline. 95. A blockade must be effective. The question whether a blockade is effective is a question of fact. 96. The force maintaining the blockade may be stationed at a distance determined by military requirements.97. A blockade may be enforced and maintained by a combination of legitimate methods and means of warfare provided this combination does not result in acts inconsistent with the rules set out in this document. 98. Merchant vessels believed on reasonable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be captured. Merchant vessels which, after prior warning, clearly resist capture may be attacked. 99. A blockade must not bar access to the ports and coasts of neutral States. 100. A blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels of all States. 101. The cessation, temporary lifting, re-establishment, extension or other alteration of a blockade must be declared and notified as in paragraphs 93 and 94. 102. The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if: (a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essential for its survival; or(b) the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade. 103. If the civilian population of the blockaded territory is inadequately provided with food and other objects essential for its survival, the blockading party must provide for free passage of such foodstuffs and other essential supplies, subject to: (a) the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted; and(b) the condition that the distribution of such supplies shall be made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power or a humanitarian organization which offers guarantees of impartiality, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. 104. The blockading belligerent shall allow the passage of medical supplies for the civilian population or for the wounded and sick members of armed forces, subject to the right to prescribe technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted.
So, the question you have to ask yourself is, "Are Israel and Hamas-governed Gaza in a state of armed conflict?"

The FreeGaza.org side of the sage of the sailing of Dignité :
It is in large part because the Dignité commenced its voyage from a French port and the French government refused to interfere with this civilian human rights initiative that the ship continues its mission. The Dignité and its passengers – from France, Canada, Greece, Sweden, and Tunisa – represent a flotilla that was delayed by acts of sabotage and by an egregious act of complicity by the Greek government with Israel’s human rights violations and policy towards Gaza that the International Committee of the Red Cross determined to be “collective punishment.” But they also represent the steadfastness and determination of the flotilla movement to sail until the blockade is broken. The idea that Freedom Flotilla II could be stopped misunderstands the nature of this non-violent movement and its strength of purpose.

Despite most of the ships being unable to leave Greek ports, the flotilla nonetheless managed to highlight the vicious nature of Israel’s policy towards Gaza. Israeli leaders showed their willingness to use intimidation, lies, economic blackmail, threats of violence, and sabotage to stop boats that Israeli military officials admitted would not be carrying weapons. This clearly demonstrates that Israel’s blockade of Gaza is not based on “security”, but is meant to punish the Palestinian people, denying their freedom and keeping them cut off from the rest of the world.
A blockade by definition is designed to "cut off" an armed adversary from the rest of the world, except as provided by the San Remo Manual.

It should also be noted that Egypt has opened its border to Gaza thus mooting much of the "cut off from the world" argument.

Monday, July 18, 2011

Somali Pirates Bothering Scientific Research

Image credit – CSIRO
Australian and U.S. navies will have to pick up a new mission - protecting and deploying environmental data collecting buoys from Somali pirates as reported in this press release - Indian Ocean pirates impede climate observations:
Australian scientists have sought the help of the United States and Australian navies to plug a critical gap in their Argo ocean and climate monitoring program caused by Somali pirates operating in the western Indian Ocean.

"We have not been able to seed about one quarter of the Indian Ocean since the increase in the piracy and that has implications for understanding a region of influence in Australian and south Asian weather and climate," says CSIRO Wealth from Oceans Flagship scientist, Dr Ann Thresher.

Over 30 nations contribute to the multi-million dollar Argo project, in which 3,000 robotic instruments provide near real-time observations of conditions such as heat and salinity in the top 2,000 metres of the ocean.

Australia, through CSIRO and the Integrated Marine Observing System (IMOS), ranks second among countries based on the number of profilers providing data, with more than 325 profilers reporting to international data centres from the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans and the Tasman Sea. At nearly two metres in length the drifting profilers, or 'floats', are programmed to drift at 1000m for 10 days, then fall to 2000m and sample as they ascend to the surface to upload their data to satellites.

Although the Argo project offers shipping and defence benefits, its primary objective is to monitor ocean heat and salinity patterns that drive the climate and monsoonal systems which bring rain to Australia.

Dr Thresher said the program is heavily reliant on commercial shipping and research and chartered vessels to deploy the instruments.
At nearly two metres in length the drifting profilers, or 'floats', are programmed to drift at 1000m for 10 days, then fall to 2000m and sample as they ascend to the surface to upload their data to satellites.

"With the region north of Mauritius being a no-go area for most vessels due to pirate activity, we have approached the US and Australian navies to assist us in deployments of around 20 profilers, including 10 provided by the United Kingdom Argo project.

"This level of international and military cooperation is tremendously important to us in building a sustainable operating ocean-borne system that is providing the data at the core of current weather and climate observations and prediction," Dr Thresher said.

CSIRO is shipping one profiler to Florida for deployment by the US Navy, and is asking the Royal Australian Navy for help deploy another eight instruments in the area of highest risk.

A 20-metre South African yacht, Lady Amber, is under charter to CSIRO and has successfully deployed seven instruments near Mauritius in the Western Indian Ocean. Her working area, however, was severely restricted by pirate activity in this area and the positions of several profilers had to be changed to accommodate these restrictions. She will deploy another 15 instrument as she transits between Mauritius and Fremantle, where she will pick up another 39 floats for deployment northwest of the Australian North West Shelf – an area thankfully free of piracy.

It's not just a job . . .

As Sean W., who sent an email on this topic, noted, ". . . [T]he pirates are really in trouble now since they're messing with the global warming people!"

CSIRO is the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.

Somali Pirates: Small Oil Tanker Taken in Gulf of Aden

EUNavFor Photo
Reported as MV JUBBA XX PIRATED IN THE NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN:
Late on the morning of 16 July, it was reported by the owners that the MV JUBBA XX, a laden tanker, had been pirated in the northern Indian Ocean, on her regular route from the United Arab Emirates to the port of Berbera, Somalia.

On the morning of 17 July, the vessel was located by a Maritime Patrol aircraft 100 nautical miles north-west of Socotra Island, heading to the northern Somali coast. Little information is available at present but it is reported that 9 suspected Somali pirates are on board MV JUBBA XX.

Hijack Location
The MV JUBBA XX is a UAE owned and flagged oil tanker, deadweight of 4831 tonnes, with a crew of 16 (1 Sri Lankan, 5 Indian, 3 Bangladesh, 1 Sudanese, 1 Myanmar, 1 Kenyan and 4 Somali). There is no information on the condition of the crew and the vessel was not registered with MSCHOA at the time of the pirating. EUNAVFOR continues to monitor the situation.
NATO report:
JULY 17, 2011
Latitude: 1348 N Longitude: 05125 E
Alert Number 203 / 2011
Alert Type: HIJACKED VESSEL
---WARNING WARNING WARNING---
At 0742UTC / 16 JUL 11 / a Merchant Vessel was reported hijacked approximately 220nm off of SOCOTRA, Vessels position as of 0813 UTC 17 Jul is 13 48 N 051 25 E
***The vessel was hijacked***
The Pirate Attack Group is still in the area.
In case you have forgotten, here's the EU list of ships being held by pirates (you can get your own copy here):
Pirated Vessel 18.07
UPDATE: Some more food for thinking about pirate success garnered from IMB's Live Piracy Report:
275-11 16.07.2011: 0340 UTC: Posn: 13:36.3N - 050:17.3E, Gulf of Aden.
Six pirates in a skiff chased a bulk carrier underway. Master raised alarm, crew proceeded to citadel and security guards on board fired a hand flare. The pirates continued to chase the ship and closed to a distance of 300 metres from the ship. The security guards fired a warning shot upon sighting guns, RPG and ladder's on the skiff. The pirates aborted the attempted attack and moved away. Incident reported to the warship.
***
273-11 13.07.2011: 0717 UTC: Posn: 12:44N – 043:18E, Bab el Mandeb straits, Red Sea. Pirates armed with guns in two skiffs chased and approached a chemical tanker underway. Master mustered crew and ship’s security team was deployed to the bridge wings. On sighting the security team, the pirates aborted the attack and moved away.
Is there a lesson to be learned?

Something like, "Low, slow and unarmed is no way to go through pirate waters?"