Latest ONI Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report (to 11 Dec 08)

The latest ONI Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report (to 11 Dec 08) can be found
here (text). Highlights:

1. GULF OF ADEN: The following guidance from EUNAVFOR ATALANTA is intended to provide guidance to the maritime community about the military measures in place to reduce the risk of piracy: EUNAVFOR ATALANTA will use the military forces at our disposal, cooperating with other states operating in the region to provide protection to all merchant vessels (MVs) in the Gulf of Aden (GOA). This will be achieved through close co-ordination of surface units, maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters, in the UKMTO Transit Corridor (UTC) and other areas of the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin which suffer from a high risk of piracy. To assist, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA will identify vessels that are especially vulnerable to successful pirate attack so that they can, where possible, be accorded additional protection. To do this, we need you to give us as much information as possible about your vessel and your transit intentions via the secure section of the MSC-HOA website. The use of non-lethal Self Protection Measures (SPMs) when under pirate attack is strongly encouraged for all ships. These can significantly reduce the risk of a successful hijacking and, importantly, provide time for military forces in the area to respond. For full details see the “Advice to Masters” section on www.mschoa.org. COMEUNAVFOR strongly recommends that merchant vessels conduct their passage within the UTC. Westbound vessels should bias themselves to the northern portion of the corridor, and eastbound vessels to the southern portion. We encourage vessels to conduct their passage through the UTC in groups based on passage speed. In order to achieve this, we will promulgate via the website, position, time, and speed for vessels to pass through a waypoint at the eastern and western limits of the UTC. This process will be known as “GOA Group Transits” (GOA GT). GOA GT timings will be at various intervals through each 24hr period. Each GOA GT will follow a recommended navigation track (NAVTRACK) through the UTC at a published speed that will avoid high profile piracy danger periods and allow maximum coordination of military assets in support. The majority of GOA GTs will be at 12 knots. Transits will also be arranged for faster and slower vessels. During your transit you should not expect to be permanently in company with a warship. But all warships in the GOA, whether part of EUNAVFOR or coordinating with us, will be aware of the GOA GTs and have the full details of vulnerable shipping (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, 9 Dec 08).
***
2. GULF OF ADEN: Vessel fired upon 2 Dec 08 at 0400 UTC while underway in position 13:57N – 049:35E. A suspicious craft was spotted on the port side at about 2 miles. Approximately 15 minutes later they were able to see 7 persons onboard in military uniforms armed with guns and RPGs. They approached the vessel about 10 meters away and fired at the vessel many times. The security team onboard the vessel responded and fired parachute rockets. The port side lifeboat was hit with one bullet hole. The gunmen aborted their attempt and all crew including security team is in good condition (Operator, UKMTO).
.
3. GULF OF ADEN: Chemical tanker fired upon 3 Dec 08 at 0419 UTC while underway in position 12:59N – 047:41E. Men armed with automatic rifles in a speedboat fired upon the tanker. The speedboat was white in color with a blue band along the top and appeared to be of metal construction. However, as the boat got closer, it became clear that the hull was made of wood. The boat also had a short bow, similar to a whaling vessel. They tried boarding the tanker twice using a portable ladder, but were unsuccessful due to the evasive maneuvers taken
by the tanker that nearly caused the speedboat to capsize. The pirates aborted the attempted attack after two hours. A coalition helicopter came to investigate (IMB).
.
4. GULF OF ADEN: Two Yemeni fishing vessels, (FALLUJAH) and (KANA), reportedly
hijacked 10 Dec 08 while underway from the Mait area near the port of Aden. According to Yemeni Coastguard, 22 men from both vessels were seized by the pirates. Seven men managed to escape from the (FALLUJAH) on a small boat and report the attack to Yemeni authorities, but 12 other crewmembers were seized, as well as the 10 men aboard the (KANA). There has been no further information provided at this time (AFP, IANS, Reuters).
.
5. GULF OF ADEN: Passenger ship reported being fired upon on 30 Nov 08 at 0528 UTC while underway in position 14:02.7N-049:43.7E. Two speedboats with three pirates in each boat attempted to intercept the ship. The master reported seeing a gun on one of the boats and that the pirates fired upon the ship. The master increased speed. The speedboats were unable to follow the ship and aborted the attempt (IMB).
***
8. GULF OF ADEN: Cargo vessel reported suspicious approach 25 Nov 08 while underway in position 13:38N – 049:06E. An apparent single craft adrift off the starboard side was observed by the bridge watch and independently by the master at approximately 2 miles. As the vessel proceeded in a westerly course at a speed of 16 kts, the small craft increased speed and approached the vessel’s starboard bow. The suspicious craft had a white hull, approximately 25 meters, with white canvass tarp across the bow. Persons were observed on this craft watching the vessel. They approached to pass along the vessel’s starboard side at approximately 70 meters
or less. The master then noticed a smaller craft under tow alongside the suspicious craft. Once on the starboard quarter, the smaller craft was observed as a blue hull, 10 meters in length with four persons equally spaced. This craft broke free, engaged propulsion and deployed from the larger craft. The master reacted by sounding the alarm and alerting the armed security team aboard. Word was passed by ship’s radio of a security emergency. The security team deployed with weapons to the ship’s stern. The crew responded to the alarm as trained. Engines were
ordered to increase speed. The suspicious craft increased speed and approached the stern of the vessel at high speed in the ship’s wake. At this time, the vessel called by VHF radio Ch. 08 to any coalition warship in the area. A warship responded, taking a verbal report from the bridge watch. The master noticed that persons were standing on the approaching craft and raising something at shoulder level. This object was not identified as a firearm but it was taken as a
threatening position. The craft approached to within 100 meters of the stern. The security team were deployed on the main deck aft. They were highly visible and prepared with firearms. Close to the vessel’s stern, the approaching craft suddenly aborted approach with a sharp change and reversal of course. Both crafts rejoined and were observed proceeding slowly in a southerly direction. A verbal report continued with the coalition warship. UKMTO was verbally notified by the master (Operator, UKMTO).
***
1. INDIA: Indian fishing trawler (KUBER) hijacked on 23 Nov 08 probably near Jakhau. The hijackers were militants involved in the 23 Nov 08 attacks in Mumbai, India. The militants killed four crewmembers and threw their bodies overboard. The captain was kept alive until reaching Mumbai's shores likely in order to aid in navigation but was killed upon arrival. Mumbai Coast Guard recovered the body of the captain from the boat and the boat is in their possession. The Coast Guard officials had confirmed on Friday that the boat found by Mumbai Coast Guard was from Porbandar (LM: news.indiainfo.com).
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2. MALAYSIA: Tug robbed on 1 Dec 08 at 2100 local time while underway in position 02:51N – 104:19E, approximately 7 NM off Teluk Juara. Ten armed men boarded the tug, threatening the master and crew with knives. They tied up the crew with rope and locked them in a compartment. They escaped with cash, documents, and personal belongings. On 2 Dec at 0215 local time, the 2nd officer reported the incident to owners and were instructed to sail the tug to Thailand. The incident was reported to the local police (IMB)

The web address in the EU information is a link to the EU Maritime Security Centre website for the Horn of Africa.

Somali Pirates: Was there really an attack on the cruise ship Athena?

Let me preface the following by a couple of cautions.

First, I have been at sea in an area where there were lots of fishing boats. Sometimes as you proceed along, the fishing boats move closer to your ship as they try to lower the nets they have strung in between them so your hull doesn't catch the nets. In such instances it looks like you have either snagged their nets and have started to tow the fishing vessels or as if the boats are closing on you with some other intent. I have had this happen off Vietnam, Japan and Taiwan, normally in littoral waters as we were approaching or departing a port. Second, I was not on the cruise ship Athena and all reports I have seen are second hand at best. Keep that in mind as you read the following.

The first is a newspaper report about the incident, in which the owners of the vessel discount an attempted attack. See Questions over whether MV Athena cruise ship to Fremantle was attacked by pirates:

The operator of a luxury liner carrying 437 passengers has hosed down reports that pirates tried to board the ship off the coast of Somalia.

Reports said more than 29 pirate boats surrounded the MV Athena, which is carrying 200 Australian women and 187 men, as it passed through the Gulf of Aden on Tuesday night local time.

A couple on board the Athena, which is due to dock in Fremantle on December 20, were reported saying they saw 29 small boats with up to six pirates on each boat approach the liner.

They said crew members had used water cannons to stop the pirates from boarding the ship.

But Grant Hunter, Australian managing director of Classic International Cruises, which operates the ship, today told ABC radio that no pirates had tried to board.

Mr Hunter acknowledged that as the Athena pulled up to the southern end of the Gulf of Aden, several tuna fishing skiffs loomed "some half a kilometre to three kilometres away" as the ship queued to enter a secure port area.
***
"Under normal international security regulations, all the ships in that particular grouping put their fire hoses on board (and) activated those," Mr Hunter said.

"The crew were spraying water off the side of the ship but at no stage did any of the skiffs attempt to get near the vessel, board the vessel.

"They weren't aggressive to the vessel."

Mr Hunter said that as part of routine security, the captain did ask passengers to remain in their cabins for about 90 minutes until the ship cleared the queue.

He said that it was difficult to understand how the reports emanated, because passengers had been eyeing the tuna boats from afar with binoculars - and vice versa.

"I don't think that indicates they were boarding," Mr Hunter said.

Now, from an email I received from a source who wishes no attribution except a statement to the effect it is from source at a private security firm "with core strength in maritime security," and offers another, different view:

The on-again/off-again, it happened/it didn't happen, attack on the Australian cruise ship ATHENA did, in fact, happen, and we should no longer doubt the extraordinarily large number of pirate skiffs involved, originally reported by eyewitnesses as about 30 to ATHENA's port side and 12 to starboard. When the press heard eyewitness accounts from passengers onboard, the cruise line acknowledged the attack initially, only to deny it 24 hours later, referring instead to passengers who were mistaken about the "very friendly" fishermen whose boats surrounded the ship (but nonetheless prompted the crew to deploy fire hoses). Companies have their reasons for saying things, and the cruise line wishes its passengers aboard ATHENA a "memorable cruising experience." It is not the company's fault that pirates tampered with the memories of her Gulf of Aden passage December 2nd.

The latest version of the corporate story has compelled Portuguese Captain Antonio Morais to explain to passengers that the "very friendly" fishermen his cruise line first described in version 2.0 were, version 3.0, pirates on a recce/training mission. Doubtless, Classic International Cruises should award the captain a medal for saving his ship and her souls (not to mention a judge's spot on "Dancing With The Stars" for the deft corporate waltz he was compelled to perform).

Nevertheless, the facts remain: after two and possibly three boarding attempts, pirates mounted a full-on effort to capture his ship. Fortunately, Portuguese mariners rock, and speed kills, sometimes thankfully: Captain Morais and ATHENA outran their attackers.

And the number of boats makes sense. Two to four boats (nominally as many as 24 combatants) capture tankers and freighters with crew of 20 or so. Some 40 boats with 200 combatants, pirates figure, can take and hold a defenseless cruise ship with hundreds of passengers and crew.

Despite the cruise line's denials, this attack was evaluated by our people, and others with a stake in the game, as totally authentic, and it involved the approximate number of boats initially reported by ATHENA passengers. I also believe it figured solidly behind a German cruise line's decision to pull passengers and much of the crew from the cruise ship COLUMBUS December 8th, fly them to Dubai and put them up in a five-star hotel to await that ship's arrival, all at considerable expense.

I also believe SECSTATE Rice and/or our people at the UN referred to ATHENA to build support for the U.S. initiative circulated at the UN to go ashore, if need be, to pursue pirates (full Security Council vote slated for December 16th). If and when we go ashore in Somalia, it is very much game-off for pirates and a most serious game-on for President-elect Obama, our Navy, Marines and special forces, and the international forces fully committed in the region. It also represents a unique challenge to General William E. Ward, U.S. Army, first Commander of U.S. Africa Command.

Perhaps it's a sign, too, that pirates made a grave error by targeting a ship named after the Goddess of Wisdom.

As is my custom, I have highlighted quoted material in blue, with my own comments in black.

The point of my opening comment is to point out that it is possible for the actions of fishing boats to be misunderstood. On the other hand, given a report by a warship of a previously observed event as a "swarm attack" (see here ) and the clear report of an attempt to attack another cruise ship, things may be as my anonymous source states.

And it would be a coup and a potential financial windfall for the pirates if they got a boatload of tourists . . . and a major escalation in this on-going conflict.

NATO Somali Piracy Update of 11 Dec 08

NATO Somali Piracy Update of 11 Dec 08 from the NATO SHipping Centre can be found here, Highlights:

2 December - a cluster of possibly co-ordinated approaches made to 5 merchant vessels in Gulf of Aden, successfully repelled by Italian destroyer, Luigi Durand de la Penne
MV CENTAURI was released 27 November (ransom payment amount not known)
MV MAERSK REGENSBURG was attacked approximately 450n miles east of Dar es Salaam (350nm west of Seychelles). Two pirate skiffs made two attempts to board the vessel and used small arms and 3x RPGs in the attack causing small fire on board. This is the most southerly incidence of piracy yet reported.
The last successful hijack was of MV BISCAGLIA 28 Nov
MV CAPTAIN STEFANOS was released 7 December; tbe vessel is now on route to Suez (ransom payment amount not known).
13 vessels remain hijacked comprising 11 merchant ships 1 fishing vessel and tug boat Yenegoa Ocean
***
In short, the trends in latest piracy incidents are as follows:

* Targeting larger cargo / oil / gas / chemical tankers
* Approaches / attacks conducted from 2-3 small speedboats with 3-5 armed persons each. The number of boats involved in each incident seems to be increasing.

Clicking on the map increases its size.

Somali Pirates: Convoys work

I don't know why David Axe limited his "convoy" reference to World War II, since convoys were a feature of anti-pirate operations going back over 500 years to the earliest days of ships carrying cargo from one point to another , but nonetheless, he writes New Anti-Pirate Tactic: World War II-Style Convoys :

This weekend the first E.U.-escorted convoy will sail from Mombasa, with a French or British frigate providing the heavy firepower. "With escorts, we're getting more food in," Smerdon said. But don't expect the same tactic to work for commercial ships plying the Gulf of Aden. According to Wahutu, most commercial ships sail on strict schedules. "If you have to wait for a convoy to form up, you lose time." And time means money.

So while the world's biggest food campaign piggybacks on World War II-style convoys, for-profit shipping is still going it alone, despite the risks.

Convoys do work, and you can lessen the time of waiting by having enough escorts available. See my earlier post calling for convoys.

UPDATE: A little Wikipedia history:

Naval convoys have been used for hundreds of years, and examples of merchant ships traveling under naval protection have been traced back to the 12th Century.[1] The use of organised naval convoys dates from when ships began to be separated into specialist classes and national navies were established.[2]

By the French Revolutionary Wars of the late 18th century, effective naval convoy tactics had been developed to ward off pirates and privateers. Some convoy contained several hundred merchant ships. The most enduring system of convoys were the Spanish treasure fleets, that sailed from the 1520s until 1790.

When merchant ships sailed independently, a privateer could cruise a shipping lane and capture ships as they passed. Ships sailing in convoy presented a much smaller target: a convoy was no more likely to be found than a single ship. Even if the privateer found a convoy and the wind was favourable for an attack, it could hope to capture only a handful of ships before the rest managed to escape, and a small escort of warships could easily thwart it. As a result of the convoy system's effectiveness, wartime insurance premiums were consistently lower for ships which sailed in convoys.[2]

NATO has an organization of personnel trained in setting up convoy operation under the name of Naval Coordination and Guidance to Shipping (NCAGS)(see here for some background and here).

The U.S. has several reserve units devoted to worrying about such matters (and in which I toiled for many years), folded into the U.S. Fleet Forces Command (pdf). More on the U.S. NCAGS program here (pdf):

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) defined
• NCAGS is a program that bridges the gap between operational forces and merchant shipping by providing a framework for communicating directions, advisories, concerns and information within a maritime region.
• The mission is to assist operational commanders in managing risk by providing situational awareness and near real-time information on the commercial shipping picture to help ensure the safe passage of merchant shipping and the safety of naval vessels. This is accomplished through the use of technology and cooperation between partner nations and commercial industry.
NCAGS is a component of the Maritime Strategy and helps build Maritime Domain Awareness
• NCAGS is an important part of the Maritime Strategy and provides a framework toward building Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), an effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States.
NCAGS Capabilities – Global Force Provider
• Organized under USFF, NCAGS units in the United States are located in Bronx, N.Y., Chicago, IL; Tacoma, Wash.; and Miami, Fla. Each unit is led by a Navy captain and includes 48 personnel from the Navy Reserve force. Many assigned personnel have extensive shipping industry experience or merchant marine qualifications.
• Liaison Officers (LNOs) -- Provide advice on NCAGS measures; senior liaison with civil maritime industry and fleet commanders.
• Shipping Coordination Team (SCT) -- Provides capability for a 24-hour watch at sea or ashore; flexible configuration adjusting to Combatant Commander needs.
• Shipping Coordination Center (SCC) -- Provides analysis capability supporting forward deployed LNOs and SCTs. SCCs are located in Dam Neck, Va., Key West, Fla., and Alameda, Calif., increasing MDA and facilitating the movement of goods and people into U.S. ports.

The NATO Shipping Centre is largely an NCAGS operation.

UPDATE2: Speaking of earlier pirate wars, how about Pompey vs. The Pirates circa 67 BC?

The pirates were at this time masters of the Mediterranean, and had not only plundered many cities on the coasts of Greece and Asia, but had even made descents upon Italy itself. As soon as Pompey received the command, he began to make his preparations for the war, and completed them by the end of the winter. His plans were crowned with complete success. Pompey divided the Mediterranean into thirteen separate areas, each under the command of one of his legates. In forty days he cleared the Western Sea of pirates, and restored communication between Hispania, Africa, and Italy. He then followed the main body of the pirates to their strongholds on the coast of Cilicia; after defeating their fleet, he induced a great part of them, by promises of pardon, to surrender to him.

Cilicia is an old name for the Mediterranean coast of Turkey.

The Athenians used convoys way back when (4th Century BC, see pages 111-112):

. . . The grain did nobody in Athens any good until it arrived . . . and there were unscrupulous competitors. . .and pirates loose all over the seas. One of the reasons Piraeus was so important a center for the grain trade was that Athens had a navy large enough to supply escorts to convoy fleets of freighters . . .

Can't beat those classic ideas.

UPDATE: Technically, unless the merchant ships are placed under military control, the proper word is not "convoy" but "accompaniment." See ATP2(B):

(1) Accompaniment. A voluntary arrangement in which merchant ships may be organised for passage through a specific area of increased risk in company with military assets. Details will be promulgated via navigational warning (NAVWARN).Accompaniment does not imply direct protection by military assets; however, the presence of military assets may act as a deterrent to any unlawful interference to merchant ships.

As compared to:

(4) Convoy. NCAGS can recommend and facilitate convoy operations for merchant shipping. The purpose of convoy operations is to escort and to protect merchant ships by means of military assets through a specific area with higher risk due to unlawful interference. The safe passage of a convoy depends on the organisation before sailing, the management and control at sea and the skilful handling of each ship while in convoy. Ships in convoy sail under military command. Merchant ships under naval supervision have to follow the orders of the Convoy Commodore, other merchant ships cannot be forced to take part in a convoy organisation, but they can be integrated on a voluntary basis. Masters are at all times responsible for the crew, safe navigation and handling of their ship. Details will be promulgated via NAVWARN.

A fine distinction, but . . . such is International Law.

Somali Pirates: U.S. wants UN approval to go after pirates ashore in Somalia

This is important news in the fight against Somali pirates, as U.S. Asking UN to Back Pursuit of Pirates on Somali Territory :

The U.S. is asking the United Nations Security Council to authorize the pursuit of pirates operating off the coast of Somalia onto land, with permission from the nation’s provisional government, diplomats said.

A draft resolution has been given to some member governments on the panel, and a vote may be sought as early as next week, when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is scheduled to be at UN headquarters in New York, according to Chinese, French and Indonesia envoys.
***
The draft will face concerns among council members such as Indonesia over concerns that pursuit of pirates onto land might violate provisions of the Law of the Sea. French Deputy Ambassador Jean-Pierre Lacroix said some countries might be “really very nervous” about authorizing landings and military engagements against pirates.

“We want to be sure we are not creating new international law,” Indonesian Ambassador Marty Natalegawa said.

Hmmm. Why would they be concerned about that? Seems like it's a throwback to the old days, when Marines went ashore in Tripoli and the French took out a Barbary pirate fortress...or even the U.S. Navy going after the Malay pirates.

If you are hosting "enemies of all mankind" I would argue that your sovereign rights (such right being suspect in the case of a failed state like Somalia anyway) are waived until the pirates, terrorists or whatever are cleaned up and if you are given the chance to do it yourself and fail, the UN members can offer to "help."

Does the UN community have the right to police a state that cannot police itself? What are the long-term ramifications of such an action?

ICC CCS Weekly Piracy Report (to 8 Dec 08)

The ICC Commercial Crime Services Weekly Piracy Report to 8 Dec 08 can bew found here. Highlights:

16.11.2008: 0945 LT: Posn: 05:34.53N – 005:22.39E, Warri river, Nigeria. Several speedboats with heavily armed men approached a general cargo ship under pilotage. They fired warning shots into the air, ordered the pilot to stop the ship and demanded the gangway ladder to be lowered. The pirates boarded the ship and sailed it to a their rebel base where they anchored it. The 19 crew were taken ashore. The crew and ship was later released. No harm to crew.

06.12.2008: 1142 UTC: Posn: 06:42S – 046:58E, off southern Somalia (450 nm east of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania / 350 nm west of Seychelles islands). Two pirate skiffs were seen approaching a container ship underway. The 2nd mate increased speed, raised alarm, activated fire hoses and mustered crew on bridge. The pirates fired upon the ship with guns and RPG. Master activated SSAS, DSC distress and increased speed to maximum. After some time, the pirates stop firing and the distance increased. The pirates reloaded their weapons and start firing again. For some reason, one of the skiffs slowed down and the other boat was just trailing without firing. Finally, the two skiffs stopped and aborted the attempted attack. No injuries to crew. A fire broke out on board the vessel due to the gunfire and RPG. A white hulled fishing boat-like vessel was sighted 10 nm away, which could be the pirate mother vessel.
***
01.12.2008: 2100 LT: Posn: 02:51.00N - 104:19.00E,7.3nm off Teluk Juara, east of Pulau Tioman, Malaysia. Ten armed pirates boarded a tug underway. They threatened the master and crew with knives. Pirates tied up the crew with ropes and locked them in a compartment. They escaped with tug's and crew cash, documents and personal belongings. On 02.12.2008 at 0215 LT, the 2nd officer reported the incident to owners and owners instructed the master to sail the tug to Thailand. Incident reported to local police.

No "War on Piracy?"

Learn to live with a certain level of piracy says Rand's Peter Chalk here. Too hard a problem to eliminate totally and, in light of the economics involved, too expensive. Besides, the cure to Somali piracy is on the beach:

As with other piracy experts, Chalk said the lawlessness off Somalia’s coast was a symptom of its anarchy on land. The absence of authorities gives pirates the ability to hijack ships and take them to ports where no police will try to free them. Also, pirate payoffs give locals a stake in helping the attacks continue. Short of invading the coastal towns that serve as pirate havens, experts have said, there is no way to strike at more than the symptoms of piracy.

Chalk also echoed other experts with his view that the U.S. and European naval patrols off Somalia could never stop all the attacks over hundreds of square miles, nor even serve as a deterrent for pirates who have proven to be wily, inventive operators. As such, the European Union’s new anti-piracy patrol, with four ships, won’t have much of an effect, Chalk said.
***
He also cautioned that pirates’ recent successes could presage new maritime terrorist attacks. There’s almost no hard evidence linking Somali pirates with Islamic terrorists, Chalk said, but terror groups could use the lessons from pirate attacks for future operations. Terrorists could also become regular third-party buyers of weapons and other goods seized by pirates.

Cruise ships and civilian ferries —“the softest of the soft targets” — are at particular risk for small-boat suicide attacks, Chalk said. Most governments treat ferries more as mass transit than as commercial vessels, he said, and the way such ships are built makes them especially susceptible to catastrophic attacks.

Containment is sometimes the best you can hope...

UPDATE: Rand press release here:

A more broad-based approach might start with a boost to the coastal monitoring and interdiction capabilities of states in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Enhanced surveillance assets, training and technical support for local navies, coast guards or other agencies would be particularly helpful.

Second, public-private partnerships could expand the use of communication and defensive technologies like the satellite tracking devices recommended by the International Maritime Bureau and non-lethal electrical perimeter fences designed to discourage unauthorized boarding.

Third, financial incentives such as lower insurance premiums should be made to encourage the international maritime industry to adhere to basic security protocols -- avoiding dangerous routes, maintaining constant anti-piracy watches, keeping in close contact with nearby vessels.

Finally, and admittedly most vexing, greater effort should be devoted to Somalia itself. Piracy off the Horn of Africa is essentially an extension of the land-based violence, corruption and lawlessness that have plagued this war-torn country since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.

Until this void in regional governance is filled, armed maritime crime will continue to proliferate around the Horn of Africa, threatening shipping and commerce in a key maritime corridor connecting Europe and Asia.

Somali Pirates: International Gang

Two AP reporters conclude "Somali piracy backed by international network":

Somalia is a failed state with no banks, only a cash-based, informal transfer network called hawala. A hawala operator takes in money on one end, then instructs a relative, friend or another agent in another country to hand a like amount to someone else. The paperless system, based on trust and oral agreements, is commonly used in the Middle East, parts of Asia and Africa.

There is some concern that the system is used for overseas payments to and from the pirates — especially now that they are getting their ransoms in cash, sometimes dropped in burlap sacks from a buzzing helicopter.

The pirates acknowledge using foreign help.

"All I can tell you is we have people in Nairobi, Djibouti, we have people in Dubai and many other countries," said Gamase Hassan Said, a pirate in Eyl speaking by telephone.

It's currently a small system dealing with relatively small sums in international crime network terms, but from tiny acorns...

Operation Christmas Drop - the 56th year

On Guam, things are getting set for Operation Christmas Drop . Not familiar with this long running "humanitarian airlift?" See here for some background.

The basic idea is to parachute in useful items to remote islands in the Pacific that have no runways:

. . .The air drops are scheduled to begin Dec. 17 and run through Dec. 21.

Operation Christmas Drop is a non-profit organization powered by volunteers from Andersen AFB and the 36th Airlift Squadron from Yokota Air Base, Japan. Every year as part of a training exercise, the two join forces to drop supplies over the Micronesian Islands.

More than 800,000 pounds of humanitarian supplies donated by local businesses, citizens and servicemembers have been dropped throughout the Micronesian Islands.

Photo caption:

Tech. Sgts. Luiz Hernadez and John Kortes fill boxes with clothes at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Dec. 7 during Operation Christmas Drop's box build. Every year in December, Airmen from Andersen AFB and the 36th Airlift Squadron from Yokota Air Base, Japan, drop humanitarian supplies donated by the Guam community over the Micronesian Islands as part of a training exercise. Sergeants Hernadez and Kortes are medics assigned to the 36th Contingency Response Group. (U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Nichelle Griffiths)

Some "training missions" are better than others...Well done there, AF!

Red arrow points to Guam on map (which should enlarge if you click on it).

I would love someone involved with the operation to send me a map of the route the drop takes.

Official Operation Christmas Drop website here. They take donations via PayPal.

Fake Out -Lying Somali Pirates: "Hostage crew tries to take back their ship" -Not

Reported here:

Crewmen on an arms-laden Ukrainian cargo ship hijacked 10 weeks ago tried to overpower their Somali captors, the pirates said Tuesday, as international efforts to stem piracy intensified.

"Some crew members on the Ukrainian ship are misbehaving. They tried to harm two of our gunmen late Monday," said a spokesman for the pirates aboard the MV Faina, held off the coast of Somalia since it was hijacked on September 25.

"This is unacceptable, they risk serious punitive measures. Somalis know how to live and how to die at the same time, but the Ukrainians' attempt to take violent action is misguided," said the spokesman, who declined to give his name.

Time for the message to the pirates: "All crewmen alive or all pirates dead!"

UPDATE: As Tom notes in the comments, it's a bogus tale:

"In reality, the following happened: Yesterday evening, two pirates who headed for the shore on a boat were seized and detained by the Americans. The pirates called intermediaries and the ship owner and asked them to speak to the Americans to ask for the release of their seized accomplices, but were told it is impossible," Mikhail Voitenko from Sovfracht Maritime Bulletin said.

"So the pirates launched the canard about a mutiny. Something like a threat," Voitenko told Ukraine's Unian news agency, citing the Faina's owner.

Gosh, if you can't trust pirates, who can you trust?

Headline updated

Max Boot on "Pirates, Terrorism and Failed States"

Max Boot opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal on Pirates, Terrorism and Failed States:

Until we are willing to place more ungoverned spaces under international administration, evils such as piracy and terrorism will continue to flourish.

So say we all of us.

Oh, and in case you were wondering, it is all the fault of the USA according to that unbiased outfit, Human Rights Watch.

USNI Blog

Can't get enough of Navy, Coast Guard, Marine and other maritime stuff? The United States Naval Institute, "the Nation’s premier independent forum for critical thinking on issues of national defense" now offers up the USNI Blog. The gang of "guest bloggers" includes Admiral Jim Stavridis, Commander of SouthCom and Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard plus some bloggers who also may be familiar to you.

Monday Reading

Fred Fry's Maritime Monday 139 with a look at the Port of Houston and much more.

CDR Salamander and the LCS ASW Module. Like it he does not.

Greyhawk on the choice of General Shinseki to head the VA. Bullet proof.

Maggie needs her mind washed out with soap.

Jane finds that the Yemeni president seems to have a strong fantasy life.

Piracy continues to move down the east African coast

A Dutch container ship outruns some would be pirates off the coast of Tanzania (that's the country below Kenya on the African east coast), as reported here:

A high seas chase in which a container ship outran pirates shows the hijackers are extending their reach further out from Somalia, mariners say.
***
"Earlier attacks were on ships off the coast of Somalia, then off the coast of Kenya and now this was 450 nautical miles off Dar es Salaam," Noel Choong of the International Maritime Bureau told [CNN]...

You know, there's lot of money in this and it is easy to imagine some additional pirate "safe havens" being established away from Somalia proper...

Circle on map indicates general area of concern.

UPDATE: More here:

But the pirates have already moved the goalposts in the game of high-seas tag with warships deployed to protect shipping, and have gradually turned their gunsights on targets outside Somalia's waters.

"The problem is that the pirates are no longer just attacking ships off the Somalian coast but are going further east and south where there is no naval protection," Noel Choong, head of the International Maritime Bureau piracy reporting centre in Kuala Lumpur told AFP.

"Previously the pirates were attacking off southern Somalia but now you are seeing attacks 400 to 500 miles from the Kenyan coast, where they are targeting ships, and they are going even as far off to Tanzania, which is further south."
***
The IMB said the ship's captain noticed a white-hulled fishing boat believed to be the pirates' mother ship near the scene of the attack.

"So it is clear that the pirates are expanding their base of operations and operational area," Choong told AFP on Monday, adding that the pirates are becoming bolder and more dangerous.

"We find it very disturbing that they are going so far out of their operational area, encroaching in waters at least two countries away."

"The fact that they can attack 450 nautical miles east of Dar Es Salaam is very worrying."

"Somalia's piracy problem is everyone's problem"

Commentary by Claude Berube, Naval Academy professor, on the Christian Science Monitor site: Somalia's piracy problem is everyone's problem:

The issue is not whether piracy is tied to terrorism, but rather how terrorists or others might employ piratical tactics. If nonstate actors find the tactic is sound and the defense against it untenable, then it will be used to conduct similar or more spectacular operations. How would nonstate actors or other future belligerents interpret any success by the pirates? Absent an effective response to lawlessness, Somali piracy may be a prism to view potential copycat killers.

Somali Pirates: System Explained

StrategyPage ofers up an explanation of how the Somali pirates operate and are sutained in Somali Pirates And Their Aggressive Agents:

Of late, the negotiations have taken about two months, and a ransom of one or two million is usually paid. This tends to be delivered, in cash, usually via a well armed tugboat coming north from Kenya (where ports like Mombassa have banks that can supply the required amount of currency, usually, per the pirates request, in used, but recent, $50 and $100 notes). The armed cash escorts bring the money to the ship, the pirates haul it ($2 million in hundreds weighs less than 30 pounds) aboard, count it, then leave with their loot. At that point, some of the armed escorts stay with the ship as the crew fires up its engines and gets them away from Somalia.

Somali Pirates: EU Arrives, NATO Leaves

Six ships and some Maritime Patrol Aircraft are joining the dozen or so warships already attempting to defend the sea lines of communication in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia, as reported here:

Six EU warships and three maritime reconnaissance aircraft will patrol the region and escort cargo ships carrying relief aid through pirate-infested waters to Somalia, as the NATO vessels have done since the end of October. The NATO ships will return to Europe.

In addition to the alliance's ships, about a dozen other warships from the United States, India, Russia and Malaysia are patrolling the region.

UPDATE: A report that a risk averse cruise line is flying passengers around the piracy area and sending empty cruise ships through, as reported here:

Now I just received a note via email from my mother on the MS. Columbus, that the ship is being evacuated to prevent any possible encounter with the pirates. I guess the attempted attack on a cruise ship last weekend concerned the German cruise line. They are unloading all passengers in Hodeidah, Yemen and will fly them to Dubai, where they will spend 3 days in a Hotel. Then they will fly to Salala, Oman and continue their journey on the MS. Columbus. The Captain is facing the potential pirate encounter with a selected crew of 50. Hopefully he will be able to outrun the pirates as well!

Sunday Ship History: 12-7-41

Somewhere in the miles between Tacoma and Hawaii, a steam ship plods through the ocean. Thirty-five souls are aboard in transit between one place and another. The ship's superstructure is white, her hull dark. She carries the name SS Cynthia Olson. Built in 1918, once named Coquina. She's now part of the Olson Shipping line out of San Francisco. A "steam schooner" they call her - all 250 feet of her. She's got a load of Army supplies and a thousand miles to to go to reach Diamond Head.

Two of the men aboard are in the Army, the rest are merchant sailors, some are veterans of a hundred sea trips, others newer to world of big oceans and little ships. Men on watch, men eating, men sleeping or reading or dreaming. A sailor smokes a cigarette. Another ties his boots. Casual chatter among the bridge watch and the engineers down below watch gauges and spin valves, adding or releasing steam, oil, water.

Out there at sea the ship is not alone. Unknown to the Captain or the crew, they have an unexpected companion. Suddenly a shadow rises from the depths and begins to attack them using a deck gun. The ship's crew radios for help, describing the gunfire from the submarine that suddenly appeared beside them at sea. The radio signal is weak and then gone - the message it carried is shocking - an unprovoked submarine attack on a merchant ship at sea.

But that shocking message is soon lost in the greater news of a much larger surprise attack. After all, what is an attack on a small merchant ship compared to the attack on the great naval fleet lying smashed at a Navy base that everyone now knows the name of - Pearl Harbor.

SS Cynthia Olson is sunk at sea with all hands and two passengers. Her master, Berthel Carlsen, goes down with the ship. As battleships lie broken and burning, SS Cynthia Olson is a very brief footnote in history except to the families and friends of her crew. She's the first U.S. merchant ship sunk by the Japanese in World War II. Sunk because she stumbled into the path of a Japanese submarine on December 7, 1941.

So, when you pause to remember the Pearl Harbor attack on this day, its 67th anniversary, add to your thoughts and prayers the 35 men killed at sea on a merchant ship, carrying goods from Tacoma to Hawaii, that met the Japanese submarine I-26 1000 miles northeast of Diamond Head on Pearl Harbor Day.

Remember all who died on 12-7-41.


More.

Somali Pirates: WaPo writes a yarn

Like some candy bars, this WaPo piece, A New Generation of Pirates Is Definitely Making Waves, is like a candy bar in which the good bits are surrounded by lots of fluff:

It's far too early for any Somali pirate's version of a Free Prince speech to be creditable. He's robbing us. For the time being, then, a Somali pirate is a thug and a kidnapper whose trade happens to share the same name as that of the great Bartholomew, the mad Blackbeard, the courtly Morgan, the misunderstood Kidd, the eloquent Bellamy.

But just look at pictures of the Somali pirates. Their blunt fashion is ragged pants and T-shirts. They wear bandannas to cover their faces, or sometimes just the top of their heads. They wear sunglasses.

Pirate chic? What next? Convenience store robber chic? Imagine-

But just look at pictures of the convenience store stick up men. Their blunt fashion is ragged pants and T-shirts, hoodies and ball caps or they wear bandannas to cover their faces, or sometimes just the top of their heads. They wear sunglasses.

They poke a finger in the eye of the "man" as they ply their dangerous trade...

UPDATE: gCaptain has a link to a BBC audio on pirates, some of whom are nice to their mothers, apparently.

"Piracy Is Terrorism"

The author of a book on old pirates states Piracy Is Terrorism, and proceeds to note that the problem with fighting them is the law:

And yet the world’s legal apparatus is woefully confused as to how to respond to piracy. Are the Somali pirates ordinary criminals, or a quasi-military force?
***
Pirates are not ordinary criminals. They are not enemy combatants. They are a hybrid, recognized as such for thousands of years, and can be seized at will by anyone, at any time, anywhere they are found.
***
Recognizing piracy as an international crime will do something else: It will give individual states that don’t want to prosecute pirates an alternative — the international court. If pirates are recognized under their traditional international legal status — as neither ordinary criminals nor combatants, but enemies of the human race — states will have a much freer hand in capturing them. If piracy falls within the jurisdiction of the international court, states will not need to shoulder the burden of prosecution alone.

Today the world’s navies are hamstrung by conflicting laws and the absence of an international code. A comprehensive legal framework is the only way to break the stalemate off Somalia. In a trial before the Old Bailey in 1696, Dr. Henry Newton, the Admiralty advocate, declared, “Suffer pirates and the commerce of the world must cease.

I feel like this has been covered before.

Law of Sea Saves Pirates

Seven lucky pirates were rescued by a Danish warship after the pirates spent several days adrift in the Gulf of Aden because the Danes complied with international law. As reported here:

“Under international law, ships are obligated to help people who are distressed at sea,” the navy said. “Because the people on board couldn’t be directly connected with a criminal act, they were treated only as distressed.”
***
“Because of the weather in the area, it wasn’t possible to tow the distressed vessel,” the navy said. “For the safety of sea transport in the area, the vessel was therefore destroyed.”

The alleged pirate vessel had been adrift in Yemen waters, and the crew has now been turned over to Yemeni authorities, the navy said. The Absalon’s crew confiscated the weapons found on board.

The weapons included anti-tank rockets and machine guns, according to broadcaster TV2. The pirates had been adrift at sea for seven days, the last three days without food or water, TV2 said.

Worth a listen: Behind The Terror: The Role Of Organized Crime

Heard most of this on the way home from a long, hard, day. I thought it was interesting enough to post a link for you, so go to Behind The Terror: The Role Of Organized Crime : NPR and listen.

Somali Pirates: UN extends right for foreign navies to pursue in Somali waters

Reported as Countries can enter Somali waters to fight piracy: UN:

The UN Security Council has passed a resolution permitting member countries to enter the territorial waters of Somalia to fight piracy.

The US-sponsored resolution, passed unanimously by the Security Council Tuesday, is valid for 12 months. It welcomes the recent initiatives taken by countries like India, Canada, France, Russia, Britain and the US to counter piracy off Somali coast.

The Security Council resolution is expected to come as a big help to countries like India that are fighting Somali pirates. Under international laws, naval ships are free to patrol international waters.
***
In its resolution, the Security Council called for "seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment" used or suspected of being used for piracy.

Actual Resolution is available here in pdf format:

6. Welcomes initiatives by Canada, Denmark, France, India, the
Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States
of America, and by regional and international organizations to counter piracy off the
coast of Somalia pursuant to resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008),
the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to counter piracy off
the Somalia coast, including by escorting vessels of the WFP, and in particular the
decision by the EU on 10 November 2008 to launch, for a period of 12 months from
December 2008, a naval operation to protect WFP maritime convoys bringing
humanitarian assistance to Somalia and other vulnerable ships, and to repress acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia
***
9. Calls upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity to do
so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and relevant
international law, by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, and through
seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in
the commission of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, or for which
there is reasonable ground for suspecting such use;
***
10. Decides that for a period of 12 months from the date of this resolution
States and regional organizations cooperating with the TFG in the fight against
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance
notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General, may:
(a) Enter into the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action
permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international
law; and
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with
such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant
international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery
at sea;
11. Affirms that the authorizations provided in this resolution apply only with
respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or
responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or
obligations under the Convention, with respect to any other situation, and
underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been provided only following the receipt of the 20 November letter conveying the consent of the TFG

Part of the effort is to preserve Somali sovereign rights. Unanswered is the question of what to do with the pirates if captured. Current law applicable to the "high seas" is UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, Part VII, :

Article 105. Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

What about pirates taken in Somali waters, which, by definition are waters "in the jurisdiction of a state," failed or not? The UN boots that over to a committee:

15. Notes that the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; urges States parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their obligations under said Convention and cooperate with the Secretary-General and the IMO to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;

So the ball now is in the court of the parties to the SUA Convention to figure out the troubling legal framework with which to deal with these pirates. You can read the SUA Convention here. The SUA Convention sprang out of the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro:

According to the provisions of the Convention, any person commits an offense if that person unlawfully and intentionally commits, attempts to commit, threatens to commit, or abets the seizure or exercise of control over a ship by force or threat of force or any form of intimidation; or commits any of the following acts if it endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship: an act of violence against a person on board; destroying a ship or damaging a ship or its cargo; placing or causing to be placed on a ship a device or substance likely to destroy the ship or cause damage to the ship or its cargo; destroying or seriously damaging maritime navigational facilities or seriously interfering with their operation; or communicating information he knows to be false. It is also an offense to injure or kill any person in connection with the commission or attempted commission of any of the previous offenses.

The Convention applies if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through, or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States. In all other cases, the Convention also applies when the offender or alleged offender is found in the territory of a State Party other than the State in whose waters the offence occurred

***
Measures to establish jurisdiction over the offenses shall be taken when the offense is committed against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes time the offense is committed; in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; by a national of that State; by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or when a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured, or killed during the commission of the offense.

Compliance and Enforcement: Once jurisdiction has been established, States shall take the offender into custody and immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts. States Parties are required to either extradite the offender in custody or submit the case for prosecution. States Parties are also required to assist each other in connection with criminal pro-ceedings brought under the Convention. States Parties are also to cooperate in the prevention of offenses by taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offenses within or outside their territories and by exchanging information in accordance with their national laws.

Clear?

Galrahn in this post links to the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard's blog, in which Admiral Allen writes:

SUA applies to nearly all of the attacks occurring in the Gulf of Aden, and obliges State Parties to criminalize such acts and establish jurisdiction when the offense is committed against their vessels or nationals. SUA establishes a framework whereby masters of ships may deliver suspected SUA offenders to a coastal State Party and the coastal State Party is obliged to accept custody and extradite or prosecute unless it can articulate why the Convention is not applicable. Leveraging States SUA obligations in conjunction with existing international law against piracy provides an effective legal framework to deliver an "endgame." We have worked for several months now with our partners on the Joint Staff, through the "interagency process", and with our international partners to pursue this outcome.

Clearer?

UPDATE: Daniel Sekulich, author and journalist, who blogs at Modern Pirate Tales suggests in the comments that the headline of this post is inaccurate.

I agree - the headline is a slightly misleading.

Daniel also is correct in his reading of the latest UN Resolution, as para 10 of the resolution does provide for the sovereign right of the TFG to give approval to the forces that may enter Somali waters by naming them to the Secretary General.

Just a couple of weeks ago the Indian Navy got such permission as set out here.

I was captured by the intent of the Resolution, rather than its substance and thereby made a mistake.

Daniel's comment did set me to thinking about the matter, though, as did his post setting out the problems created by the Somali pirate situation.

Suppose the Navy of Nowhereistan enters into Somali waters and grabs pirates for trial or even strings them up from their yardarms- what is the TFG or the UN going to do about it? Send a strong letter of protest? Or ratify the intrusion after the fact?

The TFG can't patrol its own waters against foreign fishing poachers, waste dumpers or sea robbers and apparently can't find a force ashore to go after the pirate shore bases or the pirate's leadership and financiers ashore.

It can't even be counted on to provide a court system by which captured pirates may be tried.

Continuing the illusion that Somalia is a real nation with sovereign rights may work to keep international law working, but I can't help but believe that the area would be better off if the UN declared, with or without TFG approval, that the UN was taking over the law enforcement role for Somali waters and littorals, and put the dithering NATO, EU and other navies - including private contractors - to work cleaning up the mess that the absence of the rule of law has created. Sort of protectorate for the Somali EEZ, territorial waters and the adjacent shores, as I have suggested before. Set up a court system at sea if need be.

If the UN wants to hire some of the pirates who claim to be acting as the Somali Coast Guard to be an interim Coast Guard, so much the better. Paint an orange stripe on their boats and give them arrest powers with a court that can impose penalties under the rule of law.

When the Somalis are ready to govern their own waters, the protectorate can end.

Stratfor: Mumbai attack parallels failed New York attack plan

Stratfor posts an interesting comparison between the Mumbai attack of last week with a failed plan to attack New York City several years ago in From the New York Landmarks Plot to the Mumbai Attack. From the last piece by and :

A third similarity exists in the geography of the two cities. In both plots, the use of watercraft is a distinctive tactical similarity. Watercraft gave militants access at unconventional locations where security would be more lax. Both Mumbai (a peninsula) and Manhattan (an island) offer plenty of points where militants can mount assaults from watercraft. Such an attack would not have worked in New Delhi or Bangalore; these are landlocked cities where militants would have had to enter by road, a route much more likely to encounter police patrols. Being centers of trade and surrounded by water, both Mumbai and New York have high levels of maritime traffic. This means infiltrating the area from the water would raise minimal suspicions, especially if the craft were registered locally (as was the case in the Mumbai attack). Such out-of-the box tactics take advantage of security services, which often tend to focus on established threats.
***
Ultimately, the biggest difference between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack is that the Mumbai attack succeeded. The failure of the Landmarks plot probably provided key lessons to the planners of the Mumbai attack, who were able to carry out the stages of the attack without detection and with the full element of surprise. Gauging by the success of the Mumbai incident, we can expect similar strategies and tactics in future attacks.

www.stratfor.com

Note that the U.S. Coast Guard has an on-going concern over the threats potentially posed by terrorists using recreational or other small boats as a mode of delivering themselves or weapons. See here for a look at the DHS "Small Vessel Security Strategy" and here to view in pdf format the Strategy itself.

It's a challenging environment.

UPDATE: More thoughts from James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. at the Heritage Foundation:

The use of light craft to launch the assault has reenergized discussion about similar threats to the United States. The assault "underscores the importance of what we're doing at our ports in terms of security," Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff declared, as reported in the Federal Times, "It reminds us that this is an attack vector we have to worry about."

The small-boat threat needs to be addressed, but rather than focusing on this particular terrorist tactic, Congress and the Administration should invest in improving the overall security of the maritime domain. Efforts should be expanded to improve U.S. situational awareness and law enforcement response rather than fixating on specific attack scenarios involving small boats or other terrorist threats. Additionally, any initiatives taken to specifically address the small-boat threat should address all the nation's maritime domain priorities.

Congress seems too busy bailing corporations out to worry much about funding for maritime security...

Somali Pirates: Bigger, Bolder and Thwarted by NATO ship

Five merchant ships under attack by a dozen or so pirate small boats got help from an Italian warship and her helicopter and the intervention ended the attack. As reported here:

Alerted by a distress call, the Italian navy destroyer put itself between the ships and a group of pirate "fast boats", with all vessels using water hoses to repel the pirates.

The Italian warship, Luigi Durand de la Penne, also used its helicopter against the pirates, dispersing their attack, a NATO official said.

"This is probably the biggest multiple, coordinated attack we've seen," the official said, adding that more than 12 pirate boats were involved, perhaps as many as 20.

Swarming attacks? Where have we heard that before? Oh, yes, here, in an Iranian threat.

This could be a nasty turn in the piracy war.

Happy Birthday to the Naval Armed Guard

Dec 2 is the anniversary of the first Naval Armed Guards reporting for duty to a merchant ship to act as a counterbalance to the submarines of World War II:

The first Naval armed guard detachment (seven men under a coxswain) of World War II reports to liberty ship SS Dunboyne.

Their purpose was well set out in Antisubmarine Warfare ONI Publication No. 9:

The submarine had no value as a war machine until the invention of the periscope. By the use of the periscope, partial invisibility was obtained in delivering the attack, thus giving the submarine the power of "ambush," or of making the surprise attack. The surprise attack is the reason for the submarine's existence, for without it, the submarine degenerates into slow moving torpedo boat with all its limitations.

Thus, to combat the submarine, if we prevent it from delivering this surprise, we destroy its effectiveness. In the protection of merchantmen, it should be our aim to prevent the surprise, for it is known that if the submarine once located, by maneuvering, we have a fair chance of escaping the danger of being torpedoed.

By arming merchantmen, we keep the submarine submerged, thus confining it to low speeds of small radius and preventing it from using its guns as a surface vessel.

Though the publication dates from WWI, the idea was revived for the second World War.

Much more about these Navy gunners who served on merchant hull here. And a complete Navy history here titled: Office of Naval Operations History of the Naval Armed Guard Afloat
World War II from which pages comes a tale of the first sinking of a German surface ship in a surface action. When the Germans used surface raider ships disguised as merchant men to attack Allied shipping:

The Stephen Hopkins fought one of the most gallant actions in World War II against two German raiders on September 27 about midway between Capetown and Rio de Janeiro. The vessel was proceeding on a northwesterly course at about 0935. The weather was hazy. From the north two armed raiders appeared on her starboard bow. The larger, a 7,000 ton motor ship, was a mother ship and apparently unarmed forward. The smaller, a 4,000 ton motor ship was heavily armed probably with six 5.9" guns. She was probably No. 23. The Hopkins had a 4" gun aft, two 37 mm guns forward, four .50 cal. and two .30 cal. machine guns.

Upon sighting the raiders, the Hopkins turned away to port. The larger raider immediately drew ahead. At about 1,000 yards the smaller raider opened salvo fire. Throughout the action the larger raider strafed the decks of the Hopkins with machine gun fire. Ensign Kenneth M. Willett, USNR came out on deck as the first shell struck. He was seriously wounded immediately in the stomach by shrapnel from the bursting shell. Nevertheless he continued to direct the firing of the 4" gun at the heavier armed raider until the magazine blew up. Most of the 35 projectiles struck the raider along the water line. The Cadet fired the five remaining four inch shells at the other raider. Meanwhile the machine guns from the Hopkins were sweeping the decks of the raiders and the second mate was directing the fire of the two 37 mm guns forward at the larger ship until his shell handlers were killed and the gun platform wrecked. At the end of 20 minutes the Stephen Hopkins was done for and the order was given to abandon ship. When last seen the Armed Guard officer was covered with blood but was helping cut loose the life rafts. For his action he was awarded the Navy Cross posthumously. The remaining Armed Guards were commended by the Secretary of the Navy. Only five, all wounded, survived the sinking. In addition the destroyer escort No. 354 was named for Ensign Willett. The Stephen Hopkins was awarded the Gallant Ship Citation by the War Shipping Administration.

More here, including the identity of the "Cadet" from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy who did his duty:

On 18 September, the Stephen Hopkins (Paul Buck, Captain) sailed from Cape Town, South Africa, to Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana. Several days out of Cape Town, the radio operator received a message warning of German raiders. On the morning of the 27th a lookout spotted two ships in the haze flying signal flags. They were in reality the 5,000-ton raider Stier and the 7,800-ton Tannenfels. Both immediately began firing on the Liberty ship, and what ensued was one of the most remarkable surface engagements of the war. Captain Buck immediately turned the Hopkins stern to the raiders. The armed guards manned the four-inch stern gun to defend the ship. The gun crew fired as rapidly as possible on the smaller raider. Fire from the Stier killed the gun crew one by one and volunteers replaced those who had fallen. At the same time, the Tannenfels remained at a distance, raking the Hopkins with machine gun fire that was returned by the Hopkins. The Stier had a fire control system that enabled her to fire salvos and hit the Liberty ship repeatedly. One shell hit one of the main boilers, reducing the speed of the Stephen Hopkins to one knot. Shells struck the Hopkins near the waterline, and incendiary shells eventually set fire to the main deckhouse as the ship slowly sank. The Stier, however, had paid for attacking the Stephen Hopkins. The Hopkins crew had repeatedly struck the smaller raider, now in flames and in a sinking condition. After about twenty minutes of fierce firing, the master sounded the ship’s whistle to abandon ship. In one last act of defiance, Cadet Midshipman Edwin O’Hara fired the last five remaining shells from the four-inch gun, and all struck the Stier. A salvo aimed at the gun killed O’Hara after he had fired the last round. The able-bodied men helped place the wounded in the only undamaged lifeboat. This boat searched for two hours picking up survivors. The ship’s complement originally consisted of eight officers, thirty-three men, and fifteen armed guards but only nineteen men cleared the ship. Only fifteen of these men survived – gunners, one officer and nine men. After a thirty-one day trip they made landfall at a small fishing village on the coast of Brazil.

And a note about a modern version of the Armed Guard here. It should also be remembered that the Naval Armed Guard also served in World War I.

Law screws up pirate fighting

As set out in Legal flaws hinder piracy fight, warn lawyers:

Flaws in anti-piracy laws and their enforcement are hampering the fight against ship hijacks that have claimed 40 vessels off the Somali coast this year, maritime lawyers and officials have warned.

The complex blend of international agreements and domestic rules governing piracy has triggered disagreements about when and how other ships can intervene and what to do with suspects once arrested.

You know, I think I've heard that before somewhere...

Monday Reading

Fred Fry's Maritime Monday 138 is up at gCaptain.com, with a look at Lauritzen Lines ships and enough other stuff to make you put off Monday's work until Tuesday.

CDR Salamander puts up Sid's Christmas booklist. Lots of suggestions in the comments, and you could add your own.

Lex puts a literary reference to work. Oysters.

CGBlog takes note of the "icebreaker gap." Funding...

Somali Pirates: Cruise ship hijacking attempt thwarted

As reported in International force stops pirates hijacking cruise ship:

International coalition warships stopped Somali pirates from hijacking a luxury cruise ship in the Gulf of Aden at the weekend, the Danish navy said Monday.

A Danish navy spokesman refused to name the vessel involved but a Danish media report said the cruise ship Nautica, carrying 400 passengers and 200 crew was the target of the latest attack by Somali pirates.

"The (Danish) navy's tactical command on Sunday led a military operation, dispatching a vessel from the coalition to the aid of a civilian ship threatened by pirates, thereby preventing an act of piracy," Danish navy spokesman Jesper Lynge told AFP.

Lynge said it was up to the countries involved to give details of the cruise ship involved.

According to Danish TV2 News, six to eight armed pirates on two speed boats were observed speeding toward the Nautica, a cruiseliner that had departed from Florida and was carrying 400 passengers and 200 crew.

A French navy warship, alerted by the Danish Navy, scrambled a helicopter to the scene, which sent the pirates fleeing, TV2 News said.

Photo is of MV Nautica.

UPDATE: According to its bridge webcam site here, Nautica is supposed have passed through the Red Sea and to be enroute to the Arabian Sea.